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Jeremy Butterfield
Abstract: This paper assesses the Everettian approach to the measurement problem,
especially the version of that approach advocated by Simon Saunders and David Wallace.  I
emphasise conceptual, indeed metaphysical, aspects rather than technical ones; but I
include an introductory exposition of decoherence. In particular, I discuss whether---as
these authors maintain---it is acceptable to have no precise definition of ‘branch’ (in the
Everettian kind of sense).  (A version of this paper will appear in a CTNS/Vatican
Observatory volume on Quantum Theory and Divine Action, ed. Robert Russell et al.)
1. Introduction
In this paper, I shall sketch some of the issues that arise in the interpretation of quantum
theory, from the perspective of a philosopher of physics.  I will emphasise the measurement
problem: for it is widely agreed to be the theory’s main interpretative problem (and to
equally confront advanced quantum theories, like quantum field theory). My over-arching
aim will be to emphasise how hard it is to interpret quantum theory satisfactorily: or in
other (more positive!) words, how strange are the various ontologies that the endeavour of
interpreting quantum theory suggests.
After some introductory remarks (Sections 1 and 2), I present the measurement
problem (Section 3).  I emphasise the role of decoherence (Section 4). Then I distinguish
four broad strategies for solving the measurement problem, and briefly describe three of
them (Section 5). In the last three Sections (6, 7 and 8), I discuss in more detail the fourth
strategy, viz. that of Everett (1957). This strategy encompasses several different
interpretations, but I will focus on those of Saunders (1995, 1996, 1996a, 1998) and
Wallace (2001, 2001a). (The interpretations of Deutsch, Gell-Mann & Hartle, Vaidman and
Zurek are similar---at least as I read them! But I will not enter into details of their views.)
My rationale for this choice is that the Everettian strategy has various merits, and illustrates
well how radical we might have to be in interpreting quantum theory. Besides, the positions
of Saunders and Wallace seem to me among the most attractive versions of the Everettian
strategy.
For the most part, I will cast the discussion (of all the strategies) in terms of
elementary quantum theory, neglecting relativity (whether special or general) and quantum
field theory; indeed, the discussion will be philosophical, with almost no use even of
elementary quantum theory’s technicalities. This restriction will not, I think, be misleading,
for three reasons. First, most of the discussion---both about the measurement problem and
about the strategies for solving it---also applies, once we take into account relativity and
quantum field theory.
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interpretation. For these difficulties are in general aggravated once we consider relativity
and quantum field theory. I shall occasionally give examples of these aggravations, but we
can already note two brief points. (a) The measurement problem is liable to be more severe,
once we accept, with relativity, that there is no absolute simultaneity, since one has to ask
relative to which notion of simultaneity does the ‘wave-packet collapse’. (b) By and large,
the four broad interpretative strategies face new difficulties once we turn to relativity, e.g.
if wave-packet collapse is a physical process, one has to define an appropriately relativistic
dynamics.
The third reason relates to my focussing from Section 6 onwards on the fourth
strategy, the Everettian one. There is general agreement that this strategy is more easily
adapted to relativity and quantum field theory than are the other three. For it does not
propose to solve the measurement problem by changes to the formalism of quantum theory:
while some of the other strategies’ proposed changes are hard to adapt to relativity and
quantum field theory, however satisfactory they seem for elementary quantum theory. The
Everettian strategy proposes instead to solve the measurement problem by distinctively
interpretative, indeed philosophical, claims: claims which, by and large, one can reasonably
expect to carry over smoothly to relativity (and quantum field theory)---if one accepts that
they work for the non-relativistic case.
I should add that (partly due to lack of space) the paper will have other limitations.
First, I address only some aspects of the Everettian strategy. In part this is because I have
discussed other versions than those of Saunders and Wallace elsewhere (1995, 1996). But
even as regards their versions, I will say only a little about identity through time (in Section
8), since I largely agree with what they say about it. Besides, I will say next to nothing
about two other aspects: (i) the interpretation of probability, since again I largely agree with
Saunders’ treatment; (ii) the consistent histories approach, in terms of which Saunders
(though not Wallace) casts his views---for I want to advertise Saunders’ and Wallace’s
main ideas, and they can be conveyed without using the technicalities of consistent
histories. (Clarke (this volume) discusses consistent histories.)
The paper will have three other more general limitations. (1): I will say nothing
about what connections the interpretation of quantum theory might have with theological
issues. (2): I will say nothing about issues arising from the curious non-local phenomena
that are described by quantum theory; (phenomena which occur just as much in the context
of relativistic quantum theory, as in non-relativistic quantum theory). (3): I will say next to
nothing about three out of my four broad strategies for solving the measurement problem.
My reasons for these limitations are straightforward, but connected. As to (1), I am
not competent. As to (2), Redhead (this volume) will address these issues. As to (3), I think
that by and large, the strategies that I neglect involve less strange ontologies than the fourth
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they face other difficulties. In any case, Cushing (this volume) will discuss in detail what is
perhaps the best-developed example of these other strategies; viz. the pilot-wave
interpretation of quantum theory (and of quantum field theory).
There are also of course connections between the topics of (1) to (3). Most accounts
of quantum theory, especially in the popular science literature, say that it is indeterministic
(the ‘collapse of the wave-packet’); so a theologian naturally asks whether this might afford
some scope for divine action in the world. But beware: this much-touted indeterminism is
very questionable. Only some of the four strategies accept it. In particular, the pilot-wave
interpretation is a perfectly tenable, and utterly deterministic, interpretation; and in a
similar vein, the Everettian strategy postulates a fundamental determinism, overlaid by an
apparent indeterminism. (Besides, some of the indeterministic interpretations give such
detailed and thoroughly physical models of the collapse of the wave-packet, that a
theologian might well think twice about finding in them much scope for divine action.)
I should also warn against what one might call the opposite error to that just
mentioned: namely, assuming that quantum theory is merely indeterministic---and thus that
the theology of divine action can proceed, as regards its consideration of quantum theory,
with only that notion. As I hinted above, I think this assumption is false: setting aside the
pilot-wave interpretation, the other tenable interpretations of quantum theory each involve a
stranger ontology than just the notion of indeterminism conveys.  To put the point more
pithily, in terms of reality rather than interpretations of a theory: quantum theory intimates
that reality is stranger than just indeterminism suggests.
Admittedly, it is frustratingly hard to say what this reality might be like, let alone
agree on such a description: witness the effort that goes into articulating the various
interpretations, and the continuing controversy about which is right. But I hope that the
paper will give some indication of what strange metaphysical possibilities are ‘on the
cards’.
2. The Successes of Quantum Physics---and its Open Problems
Before embarking on the measurement problem, I propose to set the stage in two ways.
First, I will emphasise how extraordinarily successful  quantum theory has proved to be in
domains of application far beyond its original one. The moral of this success is that here is
a theory we must ‘take very seriously’ as describing the world. This moral leads to my
second topic: some cautionary remarks about quantum theory’s remaining problems, and
about scientific realism and reductionism.
Examples of quantum theory’s success are legion: to take just one, quantum theory
is needed to describe the laser in a CD player. More generally, although quantum theory
was devised for systems of atomic dimensions  (10-8 cm.), it turned out to be good both for
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superconductivity and superfluidity, involving scales up to 10-1cm.). Indeed, much of the
history of twentieth century physics is the story of the consolidation of the quantum
revolution: the story of quantum theory’s basic postulates being successfully applied ever
more widely.
The point applies equally well when we look beyond physics on earth in the present
era. Quantum theory has been extraordinarily successful in application to astronomy: the
obvious example is the use of nuclear physics to develop a very accurate and detailed
theory of stellar structure and evolution, including the creation of nuclei in stars. And
similarly in cosmology: we now know a lot about primordial nucleosynthesis.
And yet: complacency, let alone triumphalism, is not in order!  Not only is physics
full of unfinished business: that is always true in human enquiry. There are also two more
specific points, which I should note.
First, there is of course no valid inference from a theory’s empirical success, even
so wide and detailed a success as quantum theory’s, to its literal truth. The most that might
be inferred is that it is rational to believe the theory is true, or approximately true; and even
that inference requires a strong form of that contentious doctrine, scientific realism.
Secondly, apart from these philosophical generalities, physics itself contains hints that
quantum theory is not true. That is, there are ‘clouds on the horizon’ that may prove as
great a threat to the continued success of quantum theory (and more generally, of twentieth
century physics), as were the anomalies confronting classical physics at the end of the
nineteenth century. Of course, people differ in what problems they find worrisome. As a
philosopher, I of course find the various mysteries of interpreting quantum theory
worrisome, as discussed in later Sections. But I should mention that the wider physics
community also recognizes at least two other ‘clouds’: the need to somehow reconcile
quantum theory and general relativity; and the cluster of problems about such issues as
renormalizability and the rigorous existence of quantum field theories---i.e. problems about
the relation of quantum theory to special relativity. (Butterfield (2001) briefly discusses
these clouds from a philosophical perspective.)
Fortunately, these points do not undermine this paper’s project, of articulating and
debating interpretations of quantum theory. For this project does not require one to ignore
the clouds that suggest quantum theory has limitations; (let alone to presuppose scientific
realism). On the contrary, one should take account of them, if one can: otherwise
interpretative debate is likely to become both isolated from the data of physics (to its
detriment), and silent as regards heuristic ideas for physics (to the detriment of physics).
However, for the reasons given in Section 1, this paper will concentrate on elementary
quantum theory.
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between theories. (1): The first is a cautionary remark about reductionism; which is, I think,
important, albeit obvious. I believe there is some strong sense in which particle physics, as
nowadays described using quantum field theory, underlies atomic physics; and that atomic
physics, in a broadly similar way, underlies chemistry; which in a broadly similar way,
underlies biochemistry; and so on.
But these inter-theoretic relations vary from one example to another, and are in any
single example often subtle and complicated, e.g. because they involve various kinds of
limit: cf. Berry (this volume, 1991) for further discussion, especially of the importance of
singular limits. So such examples will not provide neat cases of the traditional
philosophical conception of theory-reduction as logical definitional extension; (i.e. as
deducing one theory from the other, as supplemented with judiciously chosen definitions of
terms). Furthermore, to understand any single example we may well have to take a stand on
issues of interpretation of the theories concerned. In particular, an example like the relation
of atomic physics to chemistry involves the transition from quantum to classical physics;
and so understanding it is bedevilled by the measurement problem! In view of these
complications, and perhaps controversies, we must expect the  ‘higher' levels to have much
(e.g. in terms of  structures, concepts or explanations) that is distinctive, giving them a lot
of ‘autonomy' from the ‘lower’ levels.
Of course, this is not the place to investigate such relations. (I myself would be
happy to describe the higher level as ‘emergent' from lower levels, not as reduced to them;
but as it stands, ‘emergent’ is too vague, connoting just some relation of dependence
weaker than reduction. In particular, I am suspicious of making emergence precise in terms
of supervenience; cf. Section 2 of Butterfield and Isham (1999).) But theologians and other
‘outsiders to physics’ should bear in mind that to the extent that  higher levels have such
autonomy, the less pressure there will be on them to take their lessons in ontology from
physical theories of the lower levels.
(2) My second remark concerns approximation in the relation between theories. In
general, the idea that a ‘higher’ level or theory might only approximate an underlying
‘lower’ level is just one way among others that, as just discussed, inter-theoretic relations
can be subtle and complicated. But such approximations will also play a significant role in
what follows: we will see various cases where in trying to relate the classical and quantum
levels, all one can reasonably demand is that the classical should approximate the quantum.
The details of the notion of approximation will vary from case to case. In some cases, such
as decoherence (Section 4), it is a matter of numerical predictions by classical theories
being close to those of quantum theory; in other cases, such as Everettian interpretations
(Sections 6 et seq.), it is a matter of classical concepts being used as approximations by
which to grasp novel quantum concepts.
63. The Measurement Problem
I turn to expounding the measurement problem of quantum theory (hereafter, QT). It arises
from a central feature of QT’s success in describing the microrealm of electrons atoms etc.:
namely, its denial that these objects always have definite values for quantities like position,
momentum and energy.  In short, the problem is that QT apparently implies that this
indefiniteness should also be endemic in the macrorealm, i.e. the familiar realm of tables
and chairs.  This is called the ‘measurement problem’, mainly because the argument that
QT implies an indefinite macrorealm is clearest for a measurement situation.  Thus, if you
use QT to analyse a measurement of, say, the momentum of an electron, which QT says has
no definite momentum, you find that according to QT, the indefiniteness of the electron’s
momentum is transmitted to the apparatus’ pointer -- so that it has no definite position.
The details are as follows. Like other physical theories, QT assigns states to
systems: the state fully specifies the properties of the system.  But the orthodox
interpretation of a quantum state is as a catalogue of probabilistic dispositions (‘Born-rule
probabilities’). That is: for each quantity (position, energy, momentum etc.), the state
defines a probability distribution on all possible values of the quantity.  These states fall
into two kinds.
First, there are ‘pure states’, represented by vectors and written (in Dirac’s notation)
with angle-brackets, e.g. |y>. These vectors are equipped with notions of length and angle.
So it makes sense to say that |y> is of length 1, or that two vectors are orthogonal (‘at right
angles’); and more generally, the usual notions about vector spaces, such as ‘basis’ and
‘orthonormal basis’, apply. The set of vectors representing the possible pure states of the
system is called the ‘Hilbert space’ of the system. For each pure state, there are some
physical quantities and some value of each such quantity, such that: the state ascribes
probability 1 to that value for that quantity. But for each state, the great majority of
quantities are ascribed a non-trivial probability distribution. To explain this, we first need
some mathematical notions and jargon.
Each quantity is represented as a certain kind of function (‘operator’) on the
system’s Hilbert space (viz. a self-adjoint operator); and if a quantity sends a vector to a
real-number multiple of itself, then we say that the vector (or state) is an ‘eigenvector’
(‘eigenstate’) of the quantity, and the real number is the corresponding ‘eigenvalue’. Given
a quantity, most vectors are not eigenvectors of it, but rather sums of eigenvectors (with
different eigenvalues from each other); such sums are called ‘superpositions’. The set of
eigenstates of a given quantity, for a given eigenvalue, is called an ‘eigenspace’: it forms a
subspace of the space of all vectors, just as a plane through the origin forms a subspace of
ordinary three-dimensional space. If the subspace is one-dimensional (like a ray through the
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is ‘degenerate’.
 It turns out that every quantity is ‘built’ in a simple way from a special kind of
quantity, called a ‘projector’; (and so discussion often focusses on projectors). For any
subspace, the function sending all vectors orthogonally into the subspace (so that each
vector in the subspace is sent to itself) is the projector onto that subspace.  The subspace is
the projector’s range, and is also its eigenspace for eigenvalue 1; and the subspace of all
vectors orthogonal to the given subspace is its eigenspace for eigenvalue 0.  So projectors
have just two eigenvalues, 1 and 0.
It turns out that every quantity is a linear combination (with real-number
coefficients) of projectors onto mutually orthogonal subspaces, so that these subspaces are
the quantity’s eigenspaces and the real-number coefficients are its eigenvalues. The
projectors onto these subspaces are called the quantity’s ‘eigenprojectors’ or ‘spectral
projectors’. This implies that given a quantity we can find a set of its eigenvectors that are
of length 1, mutually orthogonal and together form a basis (implying that any vector is a
linear combination of them). This set is an orthonormal basis; since it consists of
eigenvectors of the quantity concerned, it is also called an ‘eigenbasis’ of the quantity: but I
shall usually just say ‘basis’. Furthermore, if every eigenprojector of a quantity is one-
dimensional (i.e. its range is a one-dimensional subspace)---equivalently, if every
eigenvalue of the quantity is non-degenerate---then the quantity’s  eigenbasis is essentially
unique, and the quantity is called ‘maximal’ (or ‘non-degenerate’).  But if an eigenvalue is
degenerate, there is freedom in specifying an eigenbasis: for one can rotate a set of
orthogonal eigenvectors spanning the eigenvalue’s eigenspace.
Turning to the physical interpretation of vectors as states that prescribe probabilities
for quantities: an eigenstate of a quantity ascribes probability 1 to the corresponding
eigenvalue.  This is a special case of the general rule whereby the state’s probability
distribution for a quantity is derived from the geometry of the vector space. In the general
case, where the state is a superposition of the quantity’s eigenstates, the probability
prescribed by |y> that quantity Q takes value q is calculated as the square of the length of
the vector got by projecting |y> down in to Q’s eigenspace for eigenvalue q. The
convention that the original |y> is of length 1, secures (by a simple generalization of
Pythagoras’ theorem) that the probabilities for the various possible values add up to 1.
The second kind of state is more general: these are the ‘mixtures’, represented by a
weighted sum of pure states, the weights adding up to 1.  For any quantity, they ascribe as
its probability distribution the weighted sum of the corresponding distributions ascribed by
the pure states.  Accordingly, mixtures are useful for calculating statistics for a
heterogeneous population (‘ensemble’) of systems, in which different pure states occur in
different proportions. A mixture is conveniently represented as a special kind of quantity,
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represented as the linear combination of the projectors onto the rays (1-dimensional
subspaces) that contain the mixture’s component pure states (with the coefficient of each
projector being its corresponding weight). Being a linear function on the vectors, this
representation can be expressed as a matrix, relative to any basis of the Hilbert space; this
is called the ‘density matrix’.
But mixtures cannot always be interpreted straightforwardly, in terms of a
heterogeneous ensemble of systems (called ‘the ignorance interpretation’).  For,
surprisingly, for any composite system, the vast majority of its pure states (namely the
‘entangled’ or ‘non-factorizable’ pure states) determine as the state of each component
system, a mixture. That is: for any entangled composite state, there is a set of pure states
and associated weights for the component system such that the correct probability
distribution for any quantity on the component system is given by the weighted sum of the
distributions ascribed by the pure states.  But beware! These mixtures cannot be given the
ignorance interpretation, on pain of forcing the composite system to be in a mixture.  That
is: if we have an ensemble of composite systems in an entangled state | y>, we cannot think
of each single specimen of the component system as in one the pure states in the mixture
determined by | y>.  For if it were, then the composite system would also be in a mixture;
(just because a population of composite systems must be heterogeneous if a factor-
population of component systems is). These curious mixtures are usually called ‘improper
mixtures’; and ignorance-interpretable mixtures, i.e. mixtures representing a heterogeneous
population, are called ‘proper’.
 For a given quantity, a superposition of its eigenstates and a mixture might ascribe
the same non-trivial distribution.  But pure states and mixtures are always distinct: any
superposition, and any mixture, will ascribe different probability distributions from one
another, for some quantity or other -- perhaps a very arcane one.  The numerical differences
in the distributions, value for value, are ‘interference terms’.
So far, I have just summarized the formalism.  Matters become more contentious
when we ask: what exactly are these probabilities of?  The orthodox answer is that they are
probabilities of measurement results.  There are two aspects to this orthodoxy: the first
restricts when a system has a value, while the second concerns measurement.
  (1): It is orthodox to say that the system has a value for a given quantity only when
its state ascribes probability 1 to that value; (the ‘eigenvalue-eigenstate link’.)  Agreed, to a
philosopher of probability, that will seem a howler.  And it may well be wrong. But
traditionally, it has been supported by two considerations.  Firstly, supposing there are
values apart from those ascribed probability 1 (‘hidden variables’), it has seemed
impossible to design measurements that yield them reliably as results.  Secondly, some
proposals for such values, though simple and natural from a formal point of view, cannot
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Kochen & Specker). And if we evade such contradictions by making the hidden variables
‘contextual’, still they will need to be non-local in some sense, in order to recover QT’s
mysterious correlations between entangled but spatially separated systems (as in Bell’s
theorem).
   (2): More generally, orthodoxy says: the probability distribution ascribed by the
state is not for values possessed at some time or other; but for values yielded as result
(pointer-reading) on a measurement apparatus.  It is curious for the interpretation of state to
invoke something so extrinsic to the system; and furthermore, for a typical measurement on
a typical quantum system, something so vast compared with the system, so variable from
occasion to occasion, and so vague.  Indeed, it is surely more than curious: it is
unsatisfactory, unless you have some general operationalist or instrumentalist view of
theories.
  This predicament prompts one to analyse measurement processes from the point of
view of QT, if necessary in a piecemeal way; hoping to vindicate this interpretation of state.
(This endeavour will also form part of a more general project: recovering classical physics,
or rather its successful predictions, for the macrorealm, in appropriate limits.)  The obvious
topic is reconciling quantum theory’s scarcity of values with the success of classical
physics’ opposite assertion, that every quantity has a value on every system.
  And thus we arrive at the measurement problem: QT seems to veto such a
reconciliation; and to do so in a way that commits it to a manifestly false prediction.  For
the quantum theoretic analysis of the interaction of, say, an electron that is indefinite for
momentum, with an apparatus for measuring momentum, suggests that the electron’s
indefiniteness will be transmitted to the apparatus -- so that its pointer is in no definite
position!  This suggestion has been proven for a wide range of exact quantum theoretic
models of measurement.  But we can confine ourselves to a very simple model.
  Before entering the details, I should mention the famous ‘projection postulate’.  It
turns out that many measurements are, to a good approximation, repeatable in the sense
that, whatever the initial state of the measured system, an immediate repetition of the
measurement always gives whatever result was first obtained. Taken together with both
aspects of the above orthodoxy, this motivates the projection postulate (‘collapse of the
wave packet’): that in a measurement, the measured system goes into the eigenstate
corresponding to the result obtained.
As we shall see in a moment, the same line of thought also motivates a similar
collapse for the apparatus, to an eigenstate of pointer position. Here I should note a
technical point: that position has no exact eigenstates, only approximate ones. But in this
discussion, I can ignore this point, which is independent of whether the system considered
is microscopic, such as an electron, or macroscopic, like a pointer: it depends just on the
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fact that position’s possible values are a continuous, not discrete set, of real numbers. More
important is the fact that it is only in the collapse of the wave packet that the alleged
indeterminism of QT occurs: the state of an isolated quantum system evolves
deterministically and continuously, according to the Schrödinger equation (‘unitary
evolution’).
  So consider a momentum measurement on an electron in a superposition of two
momentum eigenstates: one for 1 unit of momentum, and the other for 2 units of
momentum.  Suppose we have a measurement apparatus or pointer, with ‘ready state’ |r >,
which reliably reads these eigenstates, in the sense that the composite system behaves as
follows:
   | 1>|r >   ®  |1 >|reads ‘1’ >    and  | 2>|r >   ®  |2 >|reads ‘2’ >.
In words: suppose that if the composite electron+pointer is begun in the state on the left of
each displayed evolution, then it evolves by the Schrödinger equation in some fixed finite
time to the state on the right.  Then it follows (by the linearity of the Schrödinger equation)
that measuring an electron initially prepared in a superposition yields (ignoring irrelevant
normalizations):
   {| 1> +  |2 >}|r >   ®  |1 >|reads ‘1’ >  +  |2 >|reads ‘2’ >.
But the final state on the right is not an eigenstate of pointer position; (in fact this final
state determines the pointer state to be an improper mixture).  So orthodoxy, more precisely
the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, declares that the pointer has no definite position!
  There are clearly two main ways to solve this problem.  Either we somehow justify
the collapse of the wave-packet for the pointer, so that we replace the above final state by
an eigenstate of pointer position; or we somehow supplement the eigenvalue-eigenstate
link’s meagre ascription of values, i.e. we keep the above final state but nevertheless
ascribe a definite position to the pointer (without violating the ‘no hidden variables’
theorems mentioned above).
In Section 5, I will formulate these alternatives more sharply. In particular, we need
to allow, in line with the remarks at the end of Section 2, that a solution to the measurement
problem need only recover classical physics’ assertion of definite values as an
approximation. For example, the first alternative might only secure that the final state is
approximately an eigenstate of pointer position; and the second alternative might ascribe a
definite value, not to pointer position, but to another quantity that is in some suitable sense
‘very close’ to pointer position. But to formulate these alternatives more sharply, I first
need to express the measurement problem in terms of our two kinds of states, pure states
and mixtures; and to discuss decoherence (Section 4).
As presented so far, you might reply on behalf of the orthodoxy that since QT is
meant to be indeterministic, and the initial electron state was a superposition, thus ascribing
to no result a probability of 1, the final state on the right should not ascribe to the pointer a
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definite position.  Rather, you reply, it should merely ascribe to the pointer, probabilities
for the two possible positions, with probabilities given by the electron’s initial
superposition -- and the final state on the right surely does just that.
  This reply on orthodoxy’s behalf is coherent, until the last step.  There the reply
slides from what it has, to what it needs in order to have a definite result.  That is, it slides:
from (a) orthodoxy’s official interpretation of the final state, namely that a subsequent
measurement on the pointer would yield the results, ‘reads ‘1’’ and ‘reads ‘2’’ (with
probabilities given by the electron’s initial superposition); to (b) what orthodoxy needs, in
order that the pointer now has one of the two positions (with probabilities given by the
electron’s initial superposition) --  namely a proper (i.e. ignorance-interpretable) mixture of
two position eigenstates.  But orthodoxy cannot get such a mixture: the final state is pure.
  Thus we can summarize the measurement problem as the problem of justifying
replacing a pure state by a proper mixture; or in other words, as the problem of eliminating
the interference terms that distinguish such states. This summary also leads into our next
topic.
4. Decoherence
There is a fallacious solution to the measurement problem (often repeated in the
textbooks!); which however bears on alot of significant recent work on decoherence. The
idea of the solution is to use the fact, noted in Section 3, that if the pure state of a composite
system is entangled, then it determines as the state of each component system, a mixture.
This seems to solve the measurement problem.  For indeed, the final pure state above
determines as the state of the pointer just the right mixture of two position eigenstates!
  This solution fails for two reasons.  The first is insurmountable.  It is clear from
Section 3: this mixture for the pointer is not ignorance-interpretable--it is an improper
mixture, not a proper one.  So although it gives the right statistics for subsequent
measurements on the pointer, it does not secure that there is a definite result (definite
position) at the end of each individual electron measurement.  Again, we see that to get a
definite result, we need to go beyond orthodoxy: either by justifying the collapse of the
wave-packet, or by ascribing extra values.
  The second reason why this solution fails is that its apparent success---determining
for the pointer the mixture of two position eigenstates---is an artefact of our simple model
of measurement: more specifically, of our measurement's not disturbing the electron's
momentum eigenstates.  If it did disturb them, the final pure state of the composite system,
that would be obtained after measuring an electron in a superposition for momentum, would
not determine for the pointer the mathematically right mixture of two position eigenstates.
(I say ‘mathematically’ since for the first reason above, such a mixture is not
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interpretatively right---it is improper.) In fact, the final pure state would determine a
mixture with the right weights, but of two eigenstates of some quantity different from
position -- which quantity depending on how the electron was disturbed.
  But this second reason is surmountable; and work on decoherence shows how. (This
is work by many physicists over the last 25 years. Giulini et al. (1996) is a recent
monograph; cf. also Berry (this volume).)  The central idea is to take account of the fact
that the pointer is not an isolated system: it is continually interacting with its environment
of e.g. air molecules or photons.  In the physics of this interaction, the pointer's position is
crucial: and this enables us to argue, for many plausible models, that no matter how much
the measurement disturbs the electron, the final state of the ‘total system’,
electron+pointer+environment, determines for the pointer a mixture very close to the
(mathematically, though not interpretatively) right mixture of position eigenstates. The
process of obtaining this mixture is called ‘decoherence’. (The name arises from the fact
that quantum theorists often use ‘coherence’ to describe phenomena that manifest
interference terms, i.e. the state’s being a superposition rather than a mixture.) Here, ‘very
close to’ means, roughly speaking, that the eigenstates that are components of the mixture
are close to position eigenstates; where eigenstates are said to be close if they are close as
vectors in Hilbert space (or in physical terms: if they ascribe very similar probability
distributions to any quantity). A bit more precisely: the density matrix that expresses the
final state in terms of position is nearly diagonalized; i.e. its off-diagonal terms, often
called ‘tails’, are nearly zero.
So in effect, pointer position gets back ‘into the act’, not because of its initially
intended role (registering the electron's momentum), but because of its importance in the
physics of the pointer-environment interaction.  And accordingly, the argument applies not
only to apparatuses’ pointers, but also much more widely: to all kinds of macroscopic
systems (‘macrosystems’) that have a small number of macroscopic or slow or massive
degrees of freedom (like the position of the centre of mass), that interact with an
environment with very many microscopic or fast or light degrees of freedom such as air
molecules or photons.  The macrosystem can even be tiny, e.g. a dust particle 10-3 cm. in
radius.  In short, plausible models of many such cases lead to the macrosystem state being
very close to a mixture of position eigenstates.
 Furthermore, the decoherence process is extremely efficient.  That is: in many
plausible models, the macrosystem's state becomes amazingly close to the right mixture,
amazingly fast.  Thus Joos & Zeh (1985) consider (among other examples) a dust particle
of radius 10-3 cm. in air.  They consider the interference terms distinguishing a
superposition, of two positions for the (centre of mass of the) dust particle, just 10-4 cm.
apart, from the corresponding mixture.  They show that these terms converge to 0 like
exp – ( t/10-36  sec.) !  And they stay very tiny for very long time-scales (1010 years).
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So what do these results imply about how to solve the measurement problem? I
think there are three points, (A)-(C) to be made at this stage: the ubiquity of decoherence
means that they concern macrosystems in general, not just apparatuses’ pointers.
(A) The first point is a warning. The above description of decoherence is simplified.
In particular, a more exact description would allow for the following four points. (However,
I will not need to take notice of these points until I discuss the Everettian strategy in
Section 6 et seq..)
(i) There is in general no natural unique definition of ‘the macrosystem’ to be
considered, since there will be rapid and efficient decoherence for any of a wide range of
definitions. For example, the dust particle rapidly decoheres from its environment, for a
wide range of choices of which molecules to include in it.
(ii) Similarly, there is in general no natural unique definition of the relevant ‘final
state’, since the decoherence type of interaction does not get ‘turned off’: it continues---and
continues to keep the interference terms (the ‘tails’) small.
(iii) As mentioned in Section 3, there are only approximate eigenstates of position.
Besides, one can argue that to recover a definite macrorealm one needs to obtain not just
any such approximate eigenstates of position, but some that are well-behaved as regards
other quantities such as momentum, in particular by evolving according to approximately
classical laws of motion. Indeed, there are such states (‘coherent states’); and they can be
obtained by decoherence, in the sense that in some models, the components of the
macrosystem’s mixture are very close to coherent states.
(iv) Decoherence does not provide (a) a basis of states of the macrosystem, nor even
(b) a precise specification of a non-maximal quantity on it, i.e. a mutually orthogonal
family of many-dimensional subspaces. For (a): specifying a non-maximal quantity, say the
position of the centre-of-mass of a pointer, does not specify a basis, for it leaves open a
great deal about the other degrees of freedom of the pointer (including e.g. the positions of
its individual atoms). Point (b) is a generalization of (ii) above: the requirement that
interference terms be small (or be soon made small, and stay small etc.) is of course vague,
and so singles out a vague range of quantities on the macrosystem.
(B) Second: for all decoherence’s efficiency, the mixture for the macrosystem that it
provides is still not ‘interpretatively right’: it is improper.  This feature is not at all affected
by taking cognizance of (A)’s ‘wrinkles’ (i)—(iv). Nor is it contentious: some authors
suggest that we should speak, not of ‘decoherence’, but of the ‘diffusion (into the
environment) of coherence’. So: to solve the measurement problem, we must still choose
between the alternatives at the end of Section 3: either justify the collapse of the wave-
packet (applied to macrosystems), or ascribe extra values.
(C) But third: decoherence results are clearly relevant to the solution. Exactly how
they are relevant will vary from one solution to another, but we can already make two
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general points---which will be particularly relevant to my discussion of the Everettian
strategy.
 (i):  The results exemplify the remarks at the end of Section 2, that a solution to the
measurement problem need only recover classical physics’ assertion of definite values as
an approximation. For the astonishing numbers in these results liberate us from the
traditional aim of getting macrosystems to have definite values for exactly the familiar
quantities like position. Indeed, there are two possible lessons here: one uncontentious, and
one contentious. The distinction between them will become clearer in Section 5’s
discussion of (DefMac) vs (DefApp); and it will be important in Section 7’s discussion of
Saunders and Wallace.
(a): Once we see how rapid and ubiquitous the decoherence process is, we realize we
should be willing to accept a solution to the measurement problem that claims that rather
than position itself, some other extremely close quantity is definite in value; (where
‘closeness’ of quantities can be made precise as indicated above, in terms of closeness of
the quantities’ eigenstates).  For surely nobody can be so certain that exactly position, as
against a ‘close cousin’, is definite. (b): Maybe we should go further, and be willing to
accept a solution that does not even specify some single quantity as definite-valued, but
instead just states a vague range of quantities, the definiteness of any one of which would
give a definite macrorealm.
(ii): The results show us that if we endorse Section 3’s second alternative, and more
specifically propose to ascribe extra values to position for macrosystems, then orthodox
quantum theory on its own brings us close to our goal. Roughly speaking, we have only to
go a bit further, from an improper mixture to a proper one; and this will in effect be what
the Everettian strategy proposes (Section 6 et seq.).
5. Two Choices Yield Four Strategies
I turn to surveying strategies for solving the measurement problem. We have seen that one
has to choose between justifying the collapse of the wave-packet, and ascribing extra values
to quantities. Let us make this a little more precise, and introduce labels. We have to choose
between:
(Dynamics): We secure a definite macrorealm by denying the Schrödinger evolution
of a strictly isolated system, instead proposing new dynamical laws that can evolve a
pure state (superposition) into a (proper, i.e. ignorance-interpretable) mixture.
(ExtraValues) We keep the Schrödinger evolution of a strictly isolated system, and
solve the measurement problem by ascribing to certain quantities some values beyond
those prescribed by the eigenvalue-eigenstate link (while avoiding the various ‘no
hidden variable’ proofs).
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But there is also another choice to be made, which is independent of this first one; so
there will be four broad strategies to choose from. As I have described the measurement
problem so far, I assumed that the macrorealm was definite: i.e. that macroscopic objects
have definite values---if not for position, then at least for very ‘close’ quantities. But on
reflection, this assumption is debatable.
For one can take the view that the evidence in its favour (the empirical success of
classical physics with its assumption of definite values for all quantities) ultimately boils
down to our experience of the macrorealm being definite. (One might retort that this view
depends on some sort of foundationalist epistemology: which are now largely discredited.
But let us follow the line of argument.) So perhaps one should retrench, and in stating the
measurement problem, assume only the disjunction, that the macrorealm is definite---or at
least we experience it as definite. But in that case, the requirement on a solution to the
measurement problem becomes disjunctive: either to secure a definite macrorealm, or to
explain why it seems definite to us.
It is worth putting this point in terms of the general scientific enterprise of
accounting for our experience of the world. Hitherto, our discussion of the measurement
problem has envisaged that once a definite macrorealm is secured, an account will then be
given of why we experience it as definite. The discussion can admit the undeniable fact that
such an account will be very complicated; (as is shown by the complexity of theories in
perceptual psychology). And no doubt, the account must eventually address controversial
issues about the scientific understanding of consciousness.  These complexities and
controversies are considerable. But the present point is that so far, there seems to be
nothing quantum-theoretic about them. That is to say, one naturally envisages that once a
definite macrorealm is secured, some sort of non-quantum account (no doubt rooted in
classical physics and physiology) will ‘take over the job’ of accounting for experience. On
the other hand, once we entertain the idea that the macrorealm is indefinite, but that
somehow or other, we nevertheless experience it as definite---one naturally envisages that
there will be some kind of quantum-theoretic weirdness about the account of experience.
Again, it is worth introducing labels for the two alternatives:
(DefMac): We solve the measurement problem by securing a definite macrorealm; and
expect some sort of ‘classical psychophysics’ to account for experience, and in particular to
explain why the macrorealm also appears to us to be definite;
(DefApp): We allow an indefinite macrorealm; we solve the measurement problem by
securing only that it appears definite---and so expect some sort of ‘quantum
psychophysics’.
This second choice is independent of our first one.  All four combinations are logically
coherent strategies for solving the measurement problem; and indeed, all are advocated in the
literature. Of course, since the two choices and ensuing four strategies are cast in broad terms,
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there will be a considerable variety of views under each strategy; and since the strategies are
cast in rather vague terms, some specific views could perhaps be as well classified under
another strategy.
The rest of this paper will concentrate on the Everettian version of the fourth strategy,
that combines (ExtraValues) and (DefApp); and in particular on an example of this strategy
articulated by Saunders and Wallace. (The point just made applies here: the underlined labels
being vague means that some Everettians, Saunders and Wallace included, could perhaps be as
well classified under (DefMac).) But in this Section, I shall briefly mention, and give some
references for, the other three strategies. Surveying these strategies and views will help locate
the Everettian strategy in a landscape of ‘possible ontologies’ for quantum theory.
First, (Dynamics) and (DefMac). The obvious examples of this strategy are the
proposals of such authors as Gisin, Ghirardi, Pearle and Percival; all of whom propose precise
equations for the ‘collapse of the wave-packet’ of an isolated system, in such a way as to
secure at the end of a measurement procedure, an ignorance-interpretable mixture with the
correct (Born-rule) probabilities for its components. (Cf. Ghirardi et al. (1995) for an
exposition emphasising interpretative issues.)
These proposals raise many interesting issues, both physical and interpretative; (though
these two kinds of course overlap!). Prominent among the physical issues is the question:
What are the prospects for relativistic models of this kind? So far the best-established models
are non-relativistic. Prominent among the interpretative issues is the treatment of ‘tails’. That
is to say: in these models, the (pure) quantum state of an individual system at the end of a
measurement is not an exact eigenstate of the preferred quantity that according to the model
‘controls the collapse’. The state has ‘tails’, i.e. small non-zero components for other values of
the quantity. Is this a defect? Or is it enough to say what I said about decoherence at the end of
Section 4: that we simply learn that it is not exactly the quantity we originally preferred in
setting up our model, that has definite values? (I myself answer No and Yes to these
questions.)
I turn to (Dynamics) and (DefApp). The obvious examples of this strategy are the
proposals of Wigner (1962) and more recently Stapp (1993), that mind (or consciousness)
itself produces the collapse of the wave-packet. These authors do not have well-developed
models of the collapse; (though Stapp has ‘toy-models’). But the idea is that the usual
Schrödinger evolution holds throughout the physical realm, and is broken only at the
interface of brain and mind: once the mind sees one measurement result, the measured
system’s (and the pointer’s) superposition is replaced by an eigenstate, namely the one
corresponding to the result seen.
I admit to giving this sort of proposal very little credence (Butterfield 1995, pp. 130-
131; 1996a, pp. 151-156): (though it has the merit of instantiating my general theme, that
we should be willing to be radical in interpreting quantum theory!). But I should explain
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why in my taxonomy, these proposals exemplify (DefApp), not (DefMac); since doing so
will clarify a contrast with the Everettian strategy.
I admit that according to this proposal, once consciousness has ‘done its stuff' and
collapsed the wave packet, the macrorealm really is definite (for the quantities of which the
collapsed state is an eigenstate).  That is: the components of the initial superposition
corresponding to the values that are not seen by consciousness, really disappear.  It is not
just a matter of it being utterly impractical, thanks to decoherence, for us to confirm their
existence by experiments whose statistics manifest the interference terms. Nevertheless, I
classify these proposals as examples of (DefApp). For this definiteness of the macrorealm
is in general limited and temporary. After ‘consciousness stops looking’, the usual
Schrödinger evolution takes over again.  So there is no guarantee that the macrorealm stays
definite (in the favoured quantities) as times goes on, in particular when consciousness
stops looking—'when there's no one about in the Quad'. This temporary definiteness of the
macrorealm marks a major difference from the Everettian strategy; as we shall see in
subsequent Sections, it takes the definiteness of the macrorealm to be always an illusion.
So much for strategies that adopt (Dynamics). From now on I consider those that
adopt (ExtraValues). Any such strategy must address two related questions about its
postulated extra values: how they solve the measurement problem (either by (DefMac) or
by (DefApp)), and how they evolve in time. Though I will emphasise the first question, the
second is also crucial: in particular, the values must not evolve so as to undermine later on
the solution to the measurement problem that they provide at some initial time!
I turn to (ExtraValues) and (DefMac). The obvious examples of this strategy are the
pilot-wave interpretations initiated by de Broglie and Bohm between the 1920s and 1950s,
and much developed since then; (cf. Bohm & Hiley (1993), Holland (1993); and especially
for historical and philosophical issues, Cushing (1994)).  The main ideas of these
interpretations are: a quantity is “ preferred a priori” in that it always has a definite value;
the preferred quantity is position in elementary quantum  theory, and field configuration in
quantum field theory; the Schrödinger evolution of the quantum state prescribes a
deterministic evolution of this quantity’s definite value; and this definite value solves the
measurement problem (at all times!). Since Cushing (this volume) will give more details of
these interpretations, I will only expand a little on my remark in Section 1, that they are
perfectly tenable: again, doing so will clarify a contrast with the Everettian strategy.
The first point to make is that there are pilot-wave interpretations which can
plausibly claim to be empirically adequate: i.e. to recover the well-confirmed empirical
predictions of quantum theory---and even relativistic quantum theories, including quantum
field theories.  However, they lack a feature that physicists tend to value highly, namely
fundamental (as against phenomenological, or average) Lorentz-invariance: a feature which
the Everettian strategy promises to retain.
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But this is not say that the Everettian strategy has an indisputable advantage. The
pilot-wave theorist can reply that quite apart from empirical adequacy, their interpretations
also have some valuable theoretical features, in addition to being deterministic (a
traditional desideratum for fundamental physics). For example, they give a wholly lucid
and  unproblematic modelling of quantum theory’s curious non-local phenomena as arising
from an action-at-a-distance that is no more incomprehensible than Newton’s gravity;
though of course there are differences from Newtonian theory, such as that the force’s
strength does not decrease with distance.  But I do not need to try to adjudicate between the
Everettian and pilot-wave theorist. It is enough here to note, in line with Cushing (this
volume), that while rejecting pilot-wave interpretations (say because one thinks the lack of
fundamental Lorentz-invariance is a disadvantage weightier than all their advantages) is
legitimate---one should be clear that one is doing this on grounds that go beyond the
empirical.
I should add that other examples of the (ExtraValues) and (DefMac) strategy include
the modal interpretations proposed in the 1980s by such authors as Bub, Dieks, Healey, and
Kochen. In fact, there are connections between these and the pilot-wave interpretations; cf.
Bub (1997). Whether these interpretations can succeed as regards such issues as empirical
adequacy and Lorentz-invariance is still an open question. The ‘state of the art’ is represented
by some recent books: Dieks and Vermaas (1998), and Vermaas (2000).
6. The Everettian Strategy Introduced
Finally, I turn to the fourth strategy, on which the rest of the paper will focus:
(ExtraValues)  and (DefApp). So the idea will be to keep the Schrödinger evolution of a
strictly isolated system, and to allow an indefinite macrorealm; but to posit extra values so
as to secure the appearance that it is definite. As we shall see, we can think of these values
as in some sense perspectival (or even ‘mental’).
This strategy, pioneered by Everett (1957), encompasses several different
interpretations; (Barrett (1999) is a fine survey). I have elsewhere discussed some of them
(under the titles ‘Many Worlds’ and ‘Many Minds’; 1995, 1996). I will not repeat any of
that discussion here, but focus instead on another interpretation elaborated by Saunders,
which he calls ‘relativism’ (or ‘relational QT’; 1995, 1996, 1996a, 1998), and a related
interpretation of Wallace (2001, 2001a). As I mentioned in Section 1, Deutsch, Gell-Mann
& Hartle, Vaidman and Zurek have advocated similar interpretations; cf. in particular
Vaidman (1998, 2000).
I have not the space to discuss in detail these other five authors. But for clarity, I
should say at the outset that all seven authors share the following two main proposals---
with which some other Everettians would disagree. (1): They secure the appearance of a
definite macrorealm by appealing to decoherence to specify appropriate states of
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macrosystems (including tiny dust particles). (2): They accept with equanimity that
vagueness about decoherence, e.g. in saying that an interference term is small (how small?
how soon?), makes for vagueness about what is definite. The idea here is as at the end of
Section 2, and in (i)(b) at the end of Section 4. Namely: in securing definite appearances, it
is perfectly reasonable to resort to approximate, indeed anthropocentric or perspectival,
notions. In particular, it is enough to specify a vague range of quantities, the definiteness of
any one of which would give definite appearances.
It will be clearest to first explain some basic ideas about the Everettian strategy,
ideas that are common to all the interpretations it encompasses. That will occupy this
Section; the next two Sections will distinguish between such interpretations as ‘Many
Worlds’, ‘Many Minds’ and relativism.
At its simplest, the Everettian strategy is as follows.  One assumes that the entire
universe has a quantum state, presumably a pure state Y say; (but the discussion to follow
could be generalized to the universal state being a mixture). Y always evolves according to
the Schrödinger equation: after all, the universe is the only truly isolated system! Y can of
course be expressed as a superposition of states in myriadly many ways. But the
measurement problem suggests it will be a superposition corresponding to many different
definite macrorealms. As stated, this suggestion is of course vague, since ‘definite
macrorealm’ is vague. But the measurement problem suggests that however one makes it
precise or at least more precise (e.g. by appealing to decoherence), Y will have a
component (i.e. a summand with non-zero coefficient) corresponding to many different
definite macrorealms (and presumably many other states too). At this point, the Everettian
proposes their breath-taking main idea: that all these definite macrorealms are actual.
This main idea needs a lot of clarification; indeed Everettian interpretations differ
so greatly in how they clarify it, that the common slogan ‘the various definite macrorealms
are actual’ is very ambiguous. I will first give four clarifications that apply to all versions
of the Everettian strategy. Then in Sections 7 and 8, I will distinguish different Everettian
interpretations. Section 7 concerns how Everettians use Everett’s idea of relative states to
define their ‘extra values’, i.e. ‘definite macrorealm’; and Section 8 concerns the treatment
of time, including the evolution of macrorealms over time.  Though I think this order is
optimal, it is not perfect, since the various aspects of the discussion are of course related. In
particular, postponing the treatment of time to Section 8 means that until then, we lose sight
of: (i) the desideratum that ‘macrorealm’ should be so defined that the macrosystems they
contain are suitably stable over time; (ii) one of the principal claimed advantages of the
Everettian strategy---that (unlike for example pilot-wave interpretations) it allows a
fundamentally relativistic dynamics.
(Actual): First, I should relate these different but actual macrorealms to the standard
philosophical framework of possible worlds, in Leibniz and modern modal metaphysicians.
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Recall that each such world is a logically possible total course of history; one such world is
actual; propositions, including laws of nature (if such there be), are made true at worlds.
Let us assume from now on (with touching faith!) that the actual world obeys the laws of
QT, including the usual Schrödinger equation. More exactly: the actual world throughout all
time (the total course of world-history) is described by the sequence of states, Y(t) for all t.
This assumption simply sets aside QT-violating worlds, which are irrelevant for
investigating the ‘world-picture’ of QT.  Then the basic idea above is that the actual world
contains very many macrorealms: all definite, e.g. for the position of some pointer; but
different from one another, e.g. as regards which position the pointer is in.  So according to
philosophers’ standard usage of ‘world’, the name ‘Many Worlds’ is a misnomer.
I should add that some Everettians including Saunders prefer a different usage. They
say that the different macrorealms are all ‘real’, and they reserve ‘actual’ for the
macrorealm “ we are in” (in a sense yet to be clarified!). I agree that this conforms at least
equally well with everyday usage, but I have preferred to align my use of ‘actual’ with
philosophers’ current use of ‘actual world’. (Some Everettians also use ‘multiverse’ for the
one actual quantum cosmos, containing many macrorealms or ‘worlds’.)
(Branch): The second comment follows on from the first.  You might object that for
a pointer to have different values of its position -- more generally for a system to have two
or more values for a quantity -- is downright impossible.  So such a constellation of
different macrorealms cannot be in a single possible world.  But to this, the Everettian
replies that she is postulating a hitherto-unnoticed parameter, relative to which objects have
properties.  Contradiction is avoided, since the object has the contrary properties relative to
two different settings of the parameter. This line of reply is certainly coherent: it is similar
to the familiar way in which philosophers say that change of properties over time involves
no contradiction, since the object has the contrary properties relative to two different times.
(This analogy with time will be developed at the end of Section 7, and in Section 8.)
Again I should clarify terminology.  The literature uses various words, such as
‘perspective’ and ‘branch’ as well as ‘world’, for this new parameter---or rather, for its
values; but none is dominant. And none is ideal: as we will see below, ‘perspective’ can
sound too subjective; and ‘branch’ suggests the metaphor of a tree-trunk splitting into
branches, and thereby the idea of indeterministic evolution over time (with the branches
representing alternative possible histories)---which might be misleading, as we will see in
Section 8’s discussion of time. Until then, I shall for the most part use ‘(definite)
macrorealm’, ‘world’ and ‘branch' synonymously: each to be understood, until Section 8, as
defined only at an instant.
However, I should also note a helpful terminological proposal by one of ‘my’
authors, Wallace. He proposes to use ‘branch’ for what I have so far labelled a ‘(definite)
macrorealm’---which notion he (together with Saunders) takes to be: approximate; defined
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by decoherence; but nevertheless, in part anthropocentric; temporally extended, i.e. not
defined only at an instant; and to evolve stably (in some sense of ‘stably’). And since he
also advocates that an arbitrary resolution of the universal quantum state Y is perfectly
legitimate (though usually useless), he proposes to use ‘world’ for the corresponding
‘aspects of the multiverse’ (i.e. aspects of the philosophers’ ‘actual world’): so that worlds
are precise, defined arbitrarily, and in general defined only at an instant. But beware:
though Saunders’and Wallace’s views are very close, Saunders tends to resist talk of
‘branches’ and ‘worlds’. Besides, there is even more variety of usage in the literature: e.g.
Vaidman uses ‘world’ for what is roughly Wallace’s ‘branch’.
(Link): Third: note that relative to a branch, the Everettian strategy retains the
orthodox eigenvalue-eigenstate link of Section 3.  That is: it is precisely because a
summand of Y is an eigenstate of a quantity e.g. position of some pointer, that Everettians
take the branch described by that summand to be definite for that quantity.
(Indefinite): Fourth: beware of an ambiguity. I have said (in Section 5 and at the
start of this Section) that the Everettian strategy adopts (DefApp) rather than (DefMac), and
so has an indefinite macrorealm. This may now seem odd, since I have just said it involves
a plethora of definite macrorealms.  There are two points here. The first is that this is a
spurious conflict: a mere matter of words.  We can either say there is one macrorealm that
is indefinite but has perspectives or branches, relative to each of which there is
definiteness; or we can say just that there are many macrorealms, each definite. The
original formulation of the measurement problem as a threat of indefiniteness prompts the
first usage: while the Everettian’s main idea prompts the second. In short: to have many
different definites (relative to different settings of a parameter) is a way to be indefinite.
The second point leads us into differences among the various Everettian
interpretations. It is that among their rival proposals for how to make ‘definite macrorealm’
(or ‘world’ or ‘branch’) precise, some are mentalistic in a more radical sense than
Saunders’ and Wallace’s acceptance that branches be defined in an anthropocentric way.
These proposals explicitly invoke a notion of mind (or some very similar notion such as
sentience). Hence they are called Many Minds interpretations. This means that they take
‘definite macrorealm’ (or ‘world’ or ‘branch’) to require only that what in fact appears to
minds (or sentient beings) be definite. So for example, a macrosystem such as a pointer can
be indefinite in position, even within a branch. All that is required is that if it appears to
minds, then it appears to them to be definite in position; and this could be secured by
appropriate quantities defined on brains (viz. those quantities that underpin states of
perceiving a pointer to have a definite position) taking definite values relative to a branch.
So these interpretations endorse (DefApp) in a more radical sense than their rivals. (This
will become clearer in the next Section which discusses Everettians’ rival proposals for
how to make ‘definite macrorealm’ precise. For the moment, I just note that this conception
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of the macrorealm as indefinite within a branch is obviously analogous to the Wigner-Stapp
view discussed in Section 5.)
7. Defining the Branches
I turn to address what is perhaps the main question facing the Everettian strategy—how
should it define ‘definite macrorealm’ (or ‘world’ or ‘branch’)? This question is of course
the analogue for the Everettian strategy of the questions about which quantity is preferred
that confront Section 5’s other views. Accordingly, it might be called the ‘preferred
quantity problem’. Unfortunately, it is more often called the ‘preferred basis problem’,
suggesting (wrongly) that the Everettian needs to specify not just a quantity, but a basis; (or
equivalently apart from the choice of eigenvalues: a maximal quantity, i.e. a quantity all of
whose eigenvalues are non-degenerate). Indeed ‘preferred quantity’ also suggests that the
eigenvalues, not just the orthogonal family of eigenspaces, matter to the Everettian
strategy: which is presumably false. So a phrase like ‘preferred decomposition’ might be
even better; but I shall stick with the more familiar ‘preferred quantity’.
This is a multi-faceted question, to which Everettians have given very different
answers; and any full answer must of course include a discussion of how macrorealms
(branches) evolve over time. But it will be clearest to postpone that (to Section 8). For the
various Everettian answers make use of a common formal notion, viz. the notion of relative
state, introduced by Everett himself; and this notion, and even the main Everettian
proposals for how to fill it out, can be explained independently of the treatment of time.
(Indeed, the notion is itself needed for the discussion of time.) But even before explaining
the notion of relative state, and how different Everettians propose to fill it out, I need to
draw attention to a general philosophical issue, about vagueness.
7.1 Vagueness Acceptable?
One naturally requires the Everettian to propose a precise definition of ‘macrorealm’,
‘world’ or ‘branch’; i.e. to specify a preferred quantity (as the pilot-wave and modal
interpretations do). For the Everettian’s idea is that each of her proposed worlds is actual;
and it surely cannot be a vague matter what actuality itself consists of. (In particular, the
philosophical orthodoxy about vagueness is that words or concepts being vague is a matter
of semantic indecision: we simply have not decided fully what our words or concepts mean-
--in which case there is little scope for actuality itself being vague.) Yet it turns out that
Everettians’ definitions of ‘macrorealm’, ‘world’ or ‘branch’, are usually vague (cf. Section
7.2).
So the question arises: is a vague definition somehow acceptable? As mentioned
above, Saunders’ and Wallace’s answer is ‘Yes’. To be more precise:-- (i) Saunders is
reluctant to talk of worlds or branches, but—at least as I read him---that reluctance reflects
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his believing them definable only vaguely (partly because they are anthropocentric
notions). (ii) In Wallace’s usage, the Yes answer pertains to the ‘branches’, which are
defined vaguely because anthropocentrically, but not to the worlds---which are precisely
defined. So overall, Saunders reads as more anthropocentric than Wallace. (This is in part a
result of Saunders’ views being similar to those of Gell-Mann and Hartle: all three authors
relate ‘branch’ etc. to the existence of stable records, and thereby to organisms or other
complex macrosystems exploiting such records so as to survive in their local environment--
-topics I will touch on again later.)
To clarify this answer, I need to formulate two ways in which vagueness is
acceptable (the first way being very straightforward). First, vagueness about precise matters
is of course acceptable if it is simply temporary: a matter of having a working definition,
which one plans to make precise. But one might complain that the Everettians have had
some 40 years to make it precise! And one might add that Everettians’ intermittent attempts
at precise definitions have been found to have flaws: a salient recent example concerns the
consistent histories approach advocated by Saunders; cf. Dowker & Kent (1996).
The second way that vagueness can be acceptable arises from a general point about
explanation. Namely, if an explanandum is vague, its explanans can be vague. I say ‘can be’
not ‘must be’. I agree that the explanans could be precise: if so, it would thereby explain
directly one precise version of the explanandum, the other precise versions being explained
to the extent that they approximate it.
That is to say: if an explanandum is vague, the explanans can be vague (provided
that its vagueness does not somehow undermine its explanatory role). Indeed, such
vagueness would be an advantage if it somehow corresponded to the vagueness of the
explanandum, in such a way that precise versions of the explanandum were satisfactorily
explained by corresponding precise versions of the explanans. This idea of corresponding
vaguenesses is familiar in the philosophy of language. Thus Lewis (1973 Chapter 4.2)
defends his use of the vague notion of similarity in his proposed truth-conditions for
counterfactual conditionals, by maintaining that the kinds of vagueness correspond:
resolving the vagueness of these conditionals’ truth-conditions amounts to resolving the
vagueness of similarity.
These points apply to the Everettian’s project of explaining the appearance of the
familiar definite macrorealm ((DefApp)). For first: the explanandum at issue is indeed
vague---there is no precise agreement about exactly which systems have definite values for
exactly which quantities, in a ‘macrorealm’, nor about what an appearance of such requires.
Rather there is a cluster of approximate notions and doctrines relating them. This cluster
includes the example I have concentrated on, viz. macrosystems having approximately
definite positions. But one can also demand more, such as these positions changing in time
in approximate agreement with the laws of classical mechanics. And as I mentioned at the
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end of Section 6 in connection with ‘Many Minds’ interpretations, one can instead
emphasise the appearance of definiteness, and therefore consider a more anthropocentric
explanandum. Nor do we need to have any precise agreement about this explanandum:
recall from the end of Section 2 that often a superseded theory or its empirical predictions
are only approximately recovered by its successor.
Second: Everettians’ explanans, i.e. their definitions of ‘macrorealm’, are often
vague. As we shall see in more detail in Section 7.2, there have been three main Everettian
approaches: one requiring only that (roughly speaking) what in fact appears to minds is to
be definite (the ‘Many Minds’ approach); and two requiring that (roughly speaking) all
macrosystems be definite---they differ in that the more traditional of the two approaches
takes the vague notions of apparatus and pointer-position as primitive notions, while the
more recent approach uses a notion of macrosystem and appeals to decoherence. I shall
concentrate on this third approach---to which Saunders and Wallace belong. About the first
two approaches, suffice it to say here that they clearly use vague notions (such as mind and
apparatus, respectively).
As to the third approach, with its appeal to notions of macrosystem and
decoherence, we saw at the end of Section 4 that these are vague notions. (The detailed
physics of decoherence is also an active research area, so the first point above, that
vagueness can be a matter of working definition, also applies.)  In particular, there are the
questions about the size of the ‘tails’ (‘how close to diagonal is the density matrix?’), and
about which quantity decoherence selects (‘in which basis must the density matrix be nearly
diagonal?’). And broadly speaking, these kinds of vagueness do correspond to different
ways of making precise the explanandum. Besides, the ubiquity and astonishing efficiency
of decoherence means that for all macrosystems the tails will very quickly be very tiny, and
the selected quantity will be very nearly unique---so that the vagueness will be unnoticeable
by the standards of precision usual for macroscopic physics.
I conclude that at least on this third approach, the Everettians’ vagueness is
acceptable; (at least for the moment, while the physics of decoherence is still being
explored). In particular, their vagueness corresponds, broadly speaking, to a vagueness in
the explanandum; and the proviso I mentioned above---that the explanans’ vagueness does
not somehow undermine its explanatory role---seems to be met.
7.2 Relative States and Preferred Quantities
I turn to relative states. The idea is that for any pure state of a composite system consisting
of two component systems, and for any quantity on the first component, and any eigenspace
of it, there is a unique associated state of the second component, called ‘the relative state’
for the given eigenspace on the first component.  (The given eigenspace is often taken to be
one-dimensional; or equivalently, one considers an element of a basis for the given quantity
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on the first component. But this restriction is not necessary.) The idea of the ‘associated
state’ can be spelt out most easily, by using the orthodox interpretation of state as
prescribing probability distributions for measurement-results; though the idea does not rest
on this interpretation. In these terms, 'associated' means that immediately after measuring
the given quantity on the first component, and obtaining the result corresponding to the
given eigenspace, a measurement of any quantity at all on the second component will have
the probability distribution prescribed by the relative state.  In short: conditional on the first
component's result, the second component 'looks as if' it is in the relative state.
Four points of clarification, in ascending order of importance. (1) The first/second
contrast here is of course immaterial: we can similarly define the relative state of the first
component, for a given eigenspace of the second.
(2) For readers familiar with QT, it may be helpful to put the idea of relative states
in terms of the formalism.  I shall for simplicity take the given eigenspace as one-
dimensional, i.e. choose a given state on the first component. Recall that any pure state of
the composite can be written as a superposition of product states in arbitrary bases on the
components, i.e. Sij cij |fi>|y j>.  Given this initial state, we define for the given state |fi> of
system 1, the relative state of system 2 to be Sj cij |y j> (upto normalization).  A calculation
shows that this relative state prescribes the same probability distribution for any quantity
on system 2, as does the composite system state obtained by applying the projection
postulate (Lüder's rule) to the initial state and supposing you get the eigenvalue
corresponding only to |fi>; (and that this relative state depends on the choice of the pure
state of the composite system, and on |fi>, but not on the basis of all the |fi>s).
(3) I have defined the relative state in terms of the state of the composite system at
a time, and to that extent the idea of a relative state is not a relativistically invariant notion.
But of course relativistic theories are often discussed in terms of the evolution of states
from time to time; relativity requires only that there should be a suitable meshing of the
state-evolutions associated with two different foliations of spacetime. Besides, as I will
mention in Section 8, one can give a foliation-independent generalization of relative states,
using the local algebras approach to quantum theory in which quantities are associated
directly with spacetime regions: an approach advocated by Saunders.
(4) There is another respect in which the above explanation of relative state might
seem restrictive. Because it assumes from the start a composite system with two
components, you might think that this decomposition has to be in some way given ab initio;
in particular to be independent of the dynamics. Not so: no matter how one defines the
composite system and its decomposition into components, the notion of relative state
applies. This is important, for a reason often ignored in discussions about interpreting
elementary quantum theory. Namely, the particles which these discussions take to compose
their systems are, according to our best theory of matter (quantum field theory), excitations
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of underlying fields; so the very existence of what these discussions take as their systems
is, according to quantum field theory, dependent on what the state is. So there are two
morals here; first, that the notion of relative states nevertheless applies; and second, that
irrespective of this notion, we must in any case accept state-dependent (and so dynamics-
dependent) definitions of physical systems.
Let us now see how Everettian interpretations use the notion of relative state, as
applied to the universal state Y, to define their notion of ‘world’ (or ‘branch’ or
‘macrorealm’). They will differ over: (a) how they split up (‘factorize’) the Hilbert space
for the universe into Hilbert spaces of component systems; and (b) which quantity to select
on a given component, thereby defining relative states of the other component.
As I mentioned in Section 7.1, there have been three main approaches. One is
naturally called ‘Many Minds’, since it specifies the preferred components and quantities in
broadly mental terms (like ‘mind’ and ‘seeing the pointer to be in a definite position’). I set
it aside here, having discussed it elsewhere (1995, Sections 8-10; 1996). The other two are
both naturally called ‘Many Worlds’, since in addressing (a) and (b) they use broadly
physical terms (like ‘apparatus’ and ‘pointer-position’). The first, and more traditional,
Many Worlds approach assumes a notion of apparatus, i.e. a distinguished set of
subsystems of the universe, and a distinguished quantity on such an apparatus, e.g. position
of the apparatus’ pointer. These assumptions are not linked to decoherence; indeed this
approach was developed in the 1960s and 1970s, before work on decoherence took off (in
the 1980s).  On the other hand, the second, more recent, Many Worlds approach appeals to
decoherence to avoid assuming these notions. As we have seen, this means it assumes
notions of macrosystem (maybe dynamically defined), and of a dynamically-induced
preferred quantity, which is typically a quantity ‘close to’ position; and the Everettian
interpretation that is my main concern, the relativism of Saunders and Wallace, is a version
of this last approach.
Agreed, this threefold classification needs to be qualified. For the vagueness of both
the mental and the physical terms that are used means that classifying various authors’
interpretations is a delicate matter (just as it was for Section 5’s three strategies). Indeed,
there are two specific points here; of which the second is important for what follows. (1):
Although Everett’s paper is regarded as initiating Many Worlds interpretations (‘Many
Minds’ being a much more recent phrase), he may well have intended to express a Many
Minds view---as several commentators maintain. (2): As mentioned above, some versions
of the third approach---including Saunders’ and Wallace’s version---appeal to
anthropocentric considerations in their accounts of macrosystems, and the preferred
quantity on them; with the result that in some respects, these versions of the third approach
resemble the first, i.e. Many Minds, approach.
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In any case, to explain this third approach, I need to first sketch the other, more
traditional, Many Worlds approach. It will face two objections, one about vagueness, and
one about not securing a definite macrorealm: objections which the third approach can
claim to avoid, in part by being willing to appeal to anthropocentric notions.
To sketch the first approach, it will be clearest to focus first on the idealized case of
a single apparatus, together with the rest of the universe; then I will turn to the realistic case
of many apparatuses. Assuming that there is just a single apparatus, the Everettian proposes
that a branch is specified by an eigenspace of pointer-position on the apparatus, together
with the relative state (defined by Y, the state of the universe) of the rest of the universe,
for this eigenspace.  So, within the branch, the rest of the universe is in the relative state;
and, using the eigenvalue-eigenstate link within a branch, the rest of the universe has values
for exactly those quantities of which the relative state is an eigenstate. (As usual, I am
setting aside the fact that there are no exact eigenstates of position.)
As it stands, this proposed definition of a branch seems inadequate. For it seems
very unlikely to secure definiteness (in a branch) across the whole macrorealm, for the
quantities that appear to us definite.  Why should the relative state for my pointer being
here, be an eigenstate of my table being just there---and the Moon being way over there?
But the Everettian of course takes the case of a single apparatus to be an unrealistic
simplification: in whatever way she makes precise the notion of an 'apparatus', and its
special basis 'pointer-position', there will surely be many apparatuses.  And supposing there
are N apparatuses, she will define a branch as follows.  (a) The state-space of the universe is
to be factorized into N+1 factors, one factor for each apparatus, and one factor for the rest
of the universe.  (b) A branch is specified by an N-tuple of eigenspaces of pointer-position
on the N apparatuses, together with the relative state of the rest of the universe for this N-
tuple: one just treats the N apparatuses collectively as the first component system, in the
definition of relative state.  (More precisely, not every N-tuple need define a branch: but
those N-tuples that have non-zero coefficient in the expansion of Y in terms of these N+1-
fold products, do so.)
This approach faces various objections. But some of these apply to any Everettian
strategy, irrespective of the choice of preferred system and quantity, e.g. objections about
the interpretation of probability; and I will discuss some such objections later. And some of
the objections that are specific to the approach might well be answered (or are artefacts of
my exposition!). For example, (a) and (b) above seem to assume a division of the world in
to N apparatuses and ‘the rest’, independent of the state and of dynamics, contradicting
point (4) above. But this approach might well be able to reply, i.e. to accommodate (4), by
giving a more sophisticated account of ‘apparatus’.
So here, I will just state the two objections which the third approach (including
Saunders and Wallace) can claim to avoid. The first concerns vagueness. It seems wrong to
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base one’s interpretation of our fundamental physical theory, QT, on vague notions. And
indeed, commentators have criticized the appeal to ‘apparatus’ and ‘pointer position’ as
vague, and even as question-begging when taken to be part of a solution to the measurement
problem (e.g. Stein 1984, pp. 646-647; Bell 1987, pp. 96-97, 124-126; Kent 1990, p. 1754).
Second, one might again object that apparatuses are too few and far between, to
secure a definite macrorealm (on a branch): why should the collective relative state for all
these pointers being here, there etc. be an eigenstate of the Moon being way over there? In
reply, the Everettian might ‘bite the bullet’ i.e. allow such indefiniteness even within a
branch. This would be like the Many Minds approach to defining branches; cf. the comment
(Indefinite) at the end of Section 6. (It would also be rather like the way that the Wigner-
Stapp version of the (Dynamics) and (DefApp) strategy envisages indefinite macrorealms;
cf. Section 5.)
I turn to the third approach. I shall first describe what I take to be the simplest
version, and how it can claim to avoid these two objections. That will lead into the further
idea that this approach could appeal to anthropocentric notions in its account of preferred
systems, and the preferred quantity on them.
The simplest version of this approach takes as the preferred subsystems, all
macrosystems in Section 4’s sense; i.e. systems that decohere in interaction with their
environment. ‘Macrosystem’ is vague, since ‘decoherence kind of interaction’ is vague. But
it certainly includes all familiar macroscopic objects; and it includes tiny dust particles as
well as grosser objects like apparatus pointers, tables, cats and people. As to the preferred
quantity on each macrosystem, the approach takes, roughly speaking, the quantity given by
the components of the macrosystem’s improper mixture after the decoherence interaction.
That is, the quantity is to have as its eigenspaces the spaces in terms of which the improper
mixture (the macrosystem’s density matrix) is very nearly block-diagonalized as a result of
the decoherence interaction. This orthogonal family of spaces is often called ‘the
decoherence basis’, ‘basis’ now being understood more loosely so as to allow multi-
dimensional subspaces as well as rays.
This specification of the decoherence basis is vague. Indeed, it is vague in three
related ways: as regards the definition of ‘decoherence kind of interaction’; as regards when
this interaction, which of course never ‘turns off’, has ‘done its stuff’---i.e. when are the
off-block-diagonal terms small enough?; and as regards which of the many different
quantities that nearly block-diagonalize the density matrix to choose. But vagueness apart,
the quantity thus specified is typically ‘very close to’ a position-like quantity, such as the
position of the macrosystem’s centre of mass.
So the Everettian now proposes that a branch is specified by taking for every
macrosystem, a component of the improper mixture that is its state, together with the
relative state (defined by Y, the state of the universe) of the rest of the universe. So the
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proposal is similar to the first Many Worlds approach’s invocation of N apparatuses, in that
an N-tuple of eigenspaces, one from each subsystem’s Hilbert space, together with their
collective relative state, defines a branch. The difference is that N is now much greater! For
the subsystems are now all macrosystems, not just all apparatuses.
As we saw for the first Many Worlds approach, there are various objections, some of
which apply to any Everettian strategy, irrespective of the choice of preferred system and
quantity (and some of which I will discuss later). And some more specific objections might
well be answered (or are artefacts of my exposition!). For example, the approach might well
accommodate point (4) above by specifying what a macrosystem is, in a state-dependent
way. But what about the two objections against the first approach which I spelt out above?
The first, and obvious, comment concerns the second objection. Namely, the
preferred subsystems being all macrosystems, not just all apparatuses (‘N being much
greater’), means that there is no risk of the collective relative state representing an
indefinite macrorealm. A similar comment applies to the first objection, about vagueness.
Namely, the amazing efficiency and speed of decoherence mean that the preferred quantity
is far more exactly specified than on the traditional Everettian approach, with its mere
assumption of a notion of pointer-position: the decoherence basis is very exact by everyday
standards. And in reply to this first objection, the Everettian might also urge the
considerations of Section 7.1: that for a vague explanandum, one should accept a vague
explanans.
 This last point returns us to the idea of anthropocentrism. As I mentioned, some
proponents of this third approach--- Saunders and Wallace among them---appeal to
anthropocentric notions in specifying preferred systems, and the preferred quantity on
them. So my simple version of the third approach ---‘decoherence applied to all
macrosystems’---is set aside. But the details of this appeal of course vary from one author
to another, in ways I cannot here survey. So before giving some more details of Saunders
and Wallace, it must suffice to make two remarks.
(1): Any such appeal will of course lessen the gap between this third approach and
the ‘Many Minds’ approach. (2): Perhaps the best-known example of such an appeal is in
the work of Gell-Mann and Hartle. They adopt the consistent histories approach: which I
have eschewed, not least because it builds in time from the beginning---while I think it
makes for a clearer exposition to postpone issues about time (till my Section 8). So I cannot
here explain their definition of ‘consistent history space’ (or its special case, ‘quasiclassical
domain’); which are, roughly speaking, their analogues of ‘branch’ (or ‘world’ or
‘macrorealm’). Suffice it to say that they relate decoherence to the production of stable
records, and thereby to organisms or other macrosystems that exploit the existence of such
records so as to survive in their environment (i.e. systems which they call IGUSes---
information gathering and utilizing systems); (e.g. Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990).
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7.3 Saunders and Wallace
At last, I turn fully to ‘my’ authors, Saunders and Wallace. I shall first briefly discuss their
appeal to anthropocentric notions. Then I shall spend most of this subsection developing
their arguments against making a once-for-all precise definition of ‘branch’ or similar
words, i.e. of preferred subsystem and/or preferred quantity.
Concerning anthropocentrism: as I mentioned, Saunders casts his views in terms of
consistent histories. Indeed, on the present topic---the definition of ‘branch’ etc., or better,
their consistent histories analogues---his views are close to Gell-Mann’s & Hartle’s (cf.
1995 pp. 240-244, 251-253; 1996a, pp. 128-132). Therein lies the explanation, at least in
part, of his resistance to talk of ‘branches’ and ‘worlds’. (He also casts his views in terms of
the local algebras approach to quantum theory, which brings to the fore the idea of
spatiotemporally bounded events, together with the correlations between them: topics
which I will return to briefly, in Section 8.2.)
Wallace, on the other hand, does not adopt the consistent histories approach; (in
general, his views are closer to Zurek’s and Deutsch’s than are Saunders’). Besides,
Wallace does accept talk of ‘branches’ and ‘worlds’. In fact, as I mentioned in Section 6
(under (Branch)), he proposes a terminology.
(i) He proposes to use ‘branch’ for the sort of approximate anthropocentric notion,
that he and Saunders agree is needed for securing definite appearances (DefApp). This
notion is to be rooted in decoherence theory; (and, he might add, in sympathy with
Saunders: perhaps also in the theory of consistent histories). He also requires that branches,
so understood, should be temporally extended i.e. not defined only at an instant; and
besides, they should evolve stably (in some sense of ‘stably’).  But exactly how depends
branches relate to decoherence, consistency and stability is complicated, and controversial--
-not least because the physics of decoherence is still being explored.
(ii) Wallace agrees that it is perfectly legitimate to resolve the universal quantum
state Y into any basis (and to factorize the universe’s Hilbert space arbitrarily). He
emphasises that although Y is specified (and so the universe completely described) by any
such resolution, almost all such resolutions are useless. That is, they do not make any
empirical facts, whether microscopic or macroscopic, clear or even comprehensible:
physicists would call such resolutions ‘unphysical’ or ‘a bad choice of variables’. (Setting
aside Saunders’ preference for the consistent histories approach, rather than resolutions of
an instantaneous state Y,  he would no doubt agree with these points.) But since all such
resolutions of Y are perfectly legitimate (though usually useless), it is convenient to have a
word for the corresponding ‘aspects of the quantum universe (multiverse)’. Wallace
proposes to use ‘world’. So in this terminology, worlds, unlike the branches, are: precise,
defined arbitrarily, and in general defined only at an instant.
31
So much for Saunders’ and Wallace’s “main picture” . Obviously, one wants to
press for more: even if branches (in Wallace’s terminology) cannot or even should not be
exactly defined, one naturally wants more details about how they secure definite
appearances.  Equally obviously, these details lie in three directions: the present-day
understanding of the physics of decoherence etc., as presented by these and other authors;
the future physics of decoherence; and these authors’ general or conceptual doctrines about
how the branches secure definite appearances.
Clearly, I can only pursue the third direction. More specifically, the rest of this
paper will report some central claims and arguments made by both Saunders and Wallace;
(again, I postpone their claims about time till Section 8). The overall ‘message’ of these
claims and arguments will be that: (a) we probably will never get a once-for-all precise
definition of ‘branch’ or similar words, i.e. precise definitions of preferred subsystem
and/or preferred quantity that are once-for-all best for securing definite appearances; but
(b) we do not need such definitions! To report these claims and arguments, I will mainly
use ‘branch’. That is to say, I will assume that as in (ii) above, the notion of ‘world’ is taken
as precise, arbitrary and in general instantaneous; so that the debate is about whether
‘branch’ can or should be given a definition as a precise, but also non-arbitrary and
temporally extended, notion.
The first claim is that one should not take position as the precise preferred quantity.
At first sight, position is the obvious candidate, since the measurement problem as
originally set out was in effect the threat that macroscopic objects would be in delocalised
states. But there are two kinds of reason against it: various technical reasons, and one
conceptual one. As to the technical reasons, I think the lack of exact eigenstates, which
arises even in elementary quantum theory, is not so important. More important is the fact
that the concept of position in relativistic quantum theories, including quantum field theory,
is problematic. (Fleming & Butterfield (2000) is a review of the issues, both for relativistic
quantum particles and for quantum field theory, in flat spacetime; in more general
spacetimes, the problems are worse.)
Nor can one just reply to these difficulties by saying that for quantum field theory,
the preferred basis is to be the basis of definite field configurations (which is indeed a
natural analogue of elementary quantum theory’s notion of particle position).  For this basis
is also unsuitable for describing macroscopic objects: because the particles of which they
are composed are really certain kinds of superposition of these basis states. (Recall the
remark in point (4) of Section 7.2: the very existence of the particles that many discussions
take as their basic systems is a state-dependent matter.)
The conceptual reason against choosing position relates to what kind of object is to
be an ‘inhabitant’ in a branch. In short, choosing position prevents any object of our
familiar ontology, such as dust-particles, apparatus pointers, and people, from being such
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an inhabitant---it suggests rather that any such object is a collective feature of many
branches. In more detail: if we define branches in terms of position---i.e. the position of
each and every microscopic constituent, not just a coarse-grained notion like the position of
the centre of mass---then the state of any familiar object would be resolved into
simultaneous position eigenstates of all its constituents. But the chemical bonds that hold
molecules together involve delocalised electrons, so that in any such position eigenstate,
the object’s electrons are in a superposition of binding and not binding pairs of atoms. So
the eigenstate would represent an unstable ‘atomic soup’ rather than a state of the familiar
object: and conversely, any state of the familiar object depends on interference between
many different branches. In view of this, it seems wrong to say that nevertheless the object
exists in each such branch; instead we should say that the object, like its state, is some kind
of collective feature of the branches. (As at the end of the last paragraph, we here meet the
idea that the existence of what we normally consider a system, not a state, is in fact state-
dependent.)
The second claim is that this conceptual reason against choosing position
generalizes. Other apparently natural precise specifications of the preferred quantity, e.g.
energy, equally prevent ordinary objects being in a branch, and make them instead
collective features of many branches: just because interference between branches thus
defined is important to the processes that maintain the object in existence. Presumably, the
only way to avoid this problem is to take as the preferred quantity some exact ‘decoherence
basis’, i.e. some member of the vaguely delimited class of quantities selected by
decoherence (with the member perhaps also required to satisfy some other constraints). But
as I mentioned in Section 4, the physics of decoherence is much more subtle and varied
than my summaries suggest: even the vaguely delimited class varies considerably from one
kind of physical system (e.g. dust-particle in air or in outer space), or regime for a system
(e.g. high or low temperature), to another. This means that it might be unduly restrictive to
specify an exact decoherence basis, e.g. in terms of coherent states or localization in phase
space---important though these notions are. It also means, on the other hand, that to say just
that the preferred quantity is ‘some exact decoherence basis’ is very vague---in effect a
promissory note about future research on decoherence. (Agreed, it is vagueness in the
straightforward first sense of Section 7.1, viz. vagueness intended to be temporary.)
Saunders and Wallace conclude from these difficulties that we should ‘be liberal’
and accept resolutions of the universal quantum state Y in an arbitrary basis---or at least an
arbitrary basis that is a fine-graining of ‘the’ decoherence basis. This is their third claim;
(setting aside now Saunders’ preference for consistent histories, rather than resolutions of
an instantaneous state Y). So in Wallace’s terminology of ‘worlds’: they consider
continuously many bases (even if they restrict themselves to bases that fine-grain ‘the’
decoherence basis), and so are committed to continuously many worlds.
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This is certainly a dizzying ontology. After all, each of these continuously many
worlds is ‘inhabited’, i.e. each world is not just a component of a state (where states
represent reality) but also has a ‘system’ (albeit not an ordinary object!) actually in it.
(Besides they would still have continuously many worlds even if for each basis they said---
as they does not---that only one world is ‘inhabited’.) But this dizzying ontology---this
dizzying pill for curing us of the measurement problem---is sugared by three other
considerations, (A) to (C) below: of which the third is most important, and will lead us to
Section 8.
(A) The first consideration is due to Saunders rather than Wallace; (though I believe
they agree on the point). It relates to the interpretation of probability, a topic which I
foreswore in Section 1, both for reasons of space and because I largely agree with Saunders.
So here a very short explanation must suffice. Some Everettians propose that each
component of Y in a preferred quantity is inhabited by a whole population of systems: for
only with a population, they say, can we make sense of various different probabilities for
future alternatives. The idea is that given a population, ‘more of them’ can transit to future
alternative A than to B; and this makes sense of A being more probable. This proposal is
largely independent of whether one takes there to be just one preferred quantity, as
traditionally; or many, as in Saunders and Wallace’s ‘liberalism’. (I say ‘largely’, rather
than ‘entirely’, because of a point stressed by Hemmo & Pitowsky (2001): that if one takes
there to be more than one preferred quantity, and they do not commute, then to prevent
commitment to a violated Bell inequality, one will have to allow a sort of contextuality
about how systems are assigned to the various populations.) This proposal is also
independent of whether any such preferred quantity is specified in physical terms (Many
Worlds) or in mental terms (Many Minds): the claim is made by advocates of both these
approaches (e.g. Deutsch (1996), and Lockwood (1996) respectively).
But I (and Saunders, and I believe Wallace) reject this proposal, as a naïve attempt
to ground probability in counting measures, or in some version of the principle of
indifference. These are both dead horses in the philosophy of probability---which I will not
flog; (Saunders 1996: Section 6, and 1998; Butterfield 1996, Section 5). Suffice it here to
make two points.
First, rejecting this proposal means we believe the Everettian can maintain there is
only one system in each world, so that systems indeed ‘split’ when the number of worlds
increases; cf. Section 8 for more discussion. Second, the proposal does not sit very well
with the Everettian’s main idea that all the worlds are actual, ‘inhabited’. For suppose there
is no splitting, but only a stochastic process, continually re-partitioning an overall
population of persisting systems; then it is hard to see why the Everettian should postulate
more than one system, i.e. more than one world being ‘inhabited’.  (This, I believe, lies
behind some authors’ suggestions that the Everettian can and should avoid this postulate,
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and instead be like the pilot-wave interpretation in postulating just one actually possessed
value of the preferred quantity; cf. Bell (1987, p. 97, p. 133).)
(B) The second ‘sugar on the pill’ lies in what I called the conceptual reason against
specifying position to be the preferred quantity: that any familiar object is a collective
feature of many worlds. Putting this the other way around: the ‘system’ inhabiting a world
is not a familiar object---unless the world is defined by one of the (vaguely delimited!)
class of ‘decoherence bases’; (i.e. in Wallace’s terminology: unless the world is a branch).
(C) The third sugar on the pill is an analogy between worlds and the spacelike slices
of a relativistic spacetime, as conceived on the ‘tenseless’ or ‘block universe’ conception of
time. This analogy builds on that between worlds and times that I gave in (Branch) in
Section 6, as the Everettians’ answer to the charge of contradiction.
The idea of the analogy is that just as someone who accepts the tenseless conception
of time can readily accept instants i.e. spacelike slices of spacetime, as (i) useful or even
indispensable for describing phenomena, and yet (ii) not any substantive ontological
commitment additional to the commitment to spacetime; so also an Everettian can readily
accept worlds as (i) useful or even indispensable, and yet (ii) not a substantive commitment
additional to the commitment to actuality’s being described by the universal state.
This turns out to be a rich and multi-faceted analogy. It is developed in detail by
Saunders (1995, Sections 1, 7; 1996) and Wallace (2001); as Saunders notes, it goes back at
least to Geroch (1984). But I must confine myself to filling out the main idea, and
mentioning a few facets.
Recall that a classical relativistic universe can be described as a collection of
instants (spacelike slices) and their temporal relations to each other. There is great
arbitrariness in specifying these slices (i.e. in how spacetime is foliated); and any foliation
breaks some symmetries of the spacetime. But any foliation, together with its slices’
temporal relations, gives a complete description of the universe. And in everyday
circumstances, or in treating some specific problem in physics, there is an approximately
defined best choice of foliation—though the details are arbitrary, especially as regards how
to foliate spacetime far away (in space or in time) from the region whose events one aims to
describe.
I emphasise for clarity that the Everettian analogue will concern the quantum
universe at a time. So the Everettian says: similarly a quantum universe at a time can be
described as a collection of worlds and their amplitudes ci. There is great arbitrariness in
specifying these worlds, i.e. in specifying a basis, or more generally quantity (complete
orthogonal family of subspaces); and any specification breaks some symmetries of the
quantum universe at the time. But any choice of basis (i.e. of a maximal quantity) together
with its elements’ amplitudes, gives a complete description of the quantum universe at the
time. And in treating some specific problem in quantum physics (and in everyday
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circumstances, to the extent that quantum theory is needed for them!), there is an
approximately defined best choice of basis, or more generally quantity—though the details
are arbitrary, especially as regards how to specify the quantity for events other than those
one aims to describe.
As the parallel wordings show, this is a telling analogy—suggesting that Everettian
worlds should be as innocuous to someone who ‘takes quantum theory seriously’ as instants
are according to the tenseless conception of time. Furthermore, the analogy has other facets.
Some of these concern the Everettians’ treatment of time, so I postpone them to Section 8.
But I should mention here two examples.
(1): Just as the tenseless conception of time must somehow reconcile its account
with the intuitive but problematic ‘flow of time’; so also the Everettian must somehow
reconcile her account of a deterministically evolving Y with the intuitive but problematic
notion of probability. But in this paper I have foresworn the interpretation of probability: as
I said above and in Section 1, I largely agree with Saunders’ views.
(2): This facet concerns the treatment of time---but by classical physics and
metaphysics, not by Everettians. They provide an analogue of the idea above, that any
familiar object is a collective feature of many worlds; (which militated against specifying
position as the preferred quantity, and suggested that the inhabitants of worlds were
‘unfamiliar systems’). The analogue is clear. The states of objects, as we conceive them
both in everyday life and in science, are usually not instantaneous. We say that the gun
fires, the vial breaks, the cat falls: each requires the object to persist for some (vaguely
defined!) period of time. Similarly, for mental states: to see yellow, an organism must be
conscious for, say, a fifth of a second. Agreed, science, and especially physics, has
fashioned concepts of instantaneous state, which have been supremely successful. (Indeed,
so successful that nowadays, physicalism is often combined with my point about mental
states: so people say that mental states do not supervene on instantaneous physical states).
But for all their success, or even fundamentality, instantaneous states are a minority; most
of what we call ‘states of objects’ make no sense as holding only for an instant.
8. The Treatment of Time
The Everettian’s treatment of time involves various issues, both philosophical and
technical. I must confine myself to a brief discussion; (which complements my (1995
Sections 6, 7; 1996 Section 4)). In Section 8.1, I shall state another facet of Section 7.3’s
closing analogy; this will lead to related philosophical issues about identity through time. I
will conclude in Section 8.2 with a few remarks about dynamics.
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8.1 Issues about Identity through Time
To state the new facet of section 7.3’s analogy, I again start on the ‘classical spacetime
side’. We have no exact criterion of identity over time for familiar objects, like dust
particles, tables, cats and people; but we can nevertheless make do both in everyday and
scientific life (everywhere but philosophy’s puzzle-cases of teleportation, fission, brain-
transplant etc.) with vague and approximate criteria of identity. So also, says the analogy,
the Everettian can admit to having no exact criterion of identity over time for the systems
that are inhabitants of worlds, the vast majority of which, as we have seen, are not familiar
objects; but the Everettian can nevertheless make do with vague and approximate criteria of
identity.
To explain this, recall first that ever since Section 6, the Everettian’s worlds have
been defined only at an instant: although the word ‘world’ (and equally ‘branch’, ‘system’
and ‘inhabitant’) suggests persistence over time, the discussion hitherto has not needed any
Everettian account about what such persistence is to involve: in philosophers’ jargon, what
worlds’ criteria of identity are.  The present suggestion, endorsed equally by Saunders and
Wallace, is that the Everettian need not give a uniform account, the same for all worlds (or
branches etc.). Nor need she give a precise but non-uniform account: i.e. an account that
first divides worlds etc. into different kinds, and then gives different exact accounts for
different kinds.
Indeed, for Saunders and Wallace, she should not do so. For as we have seen, they
allow arbitrary resolutions of Y to define worlds; and almost all such resolutions are
‘unphysical’. In particular, they will be useful for describing macroscopic facts only if they
are a ‘decoherence basis’, i.e. some member of the vaguely delimited class of quantities
selected by decoherence; (maybe they could also be moderate fine-grainings or coarse-
grainings of a decoherence basis). So of course we should not expect a useful notion of
persistence to be definable for arbitrary worlds.
On the other hand, a few of these resolutions, viz. the decoherence bases (and maybe
also moderate fine-grainings or coarse-grainings of them), describe familiar macroscopic
objects, from dust particles to people. So we should expect to be able to define persistence
for the worlds given by these resolutions. Or rather, we should be able to do this vaguely
and approximately, just as we do for dust particles to people.  In short: the suggestion is
that persistence makes no sense for arbitrary worlds, but makes vague and approximate
sense for macroscopic objects (in the way familiar from philosophical discussions of
identity over time).
All this I find plausible. But the topic of worlds’ criteria of identity over time also
raises other issues which are not part of Section 7.3’s analogy: issues to do with the
‘splitting’ of worlds over time. Although the Everettian has defined worlds only relative to
an instant, she of course must accept different numbers of worlds at different times: this
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occurs whenever an eigenstate unitarily evolves into a superposition. For example, in
Section 3’s toy-model of measurement, there was one world before the measurement
interaction, and two after. Hence the widespread use of the word ‘branch’, based on the
image of a tree-trunk splitting into branches. But how exactly should we understand such
splitting?
 The first point to make is a matter of ground-clearing. I agree that Everettians who
hold that each component of Y in a preferred basis is inhabited by a whole population of
systems can avoid the number of worlds changing in time. For they can say that different
members of such a population evolve to different later components: they simply ‘go
different ways’ during a so-called ‘splitting’. But in Section 7.3, I already joined Saunders
and Wallace in rejecting the idea of each component being inhabited by a whole population,
for it seems motivated only by a bad reason---the attempt to ground probabilities in
counting, or in some version of the principle of indifference. So my question is: assuming
that at any one time there is only one ‘inhabitant’ in each world, how should we understand
splitting?
Again, Saunders has addressed this question: partly by comparing it with the
question, much studied in philosophical discussions of identity over time (especially
personal identity), of how to understand cases of fission of ordinary objects (including
people); and partly by connecting it to his discussion of probability (1998, Sections 4-6).
Again, I find his account plausible, but cannot enter into details. Yet there is one aspect of
the question which is independent of the above discussion about allowing vague criteria of
identity, and yet so central to the topic of identity over time (and so closely related to the
analogy between worlds and times, even in its basic form from (Branch) of Section 6, rather
than from Section 7.3)---that I must address it.
This aspect turns on the fact that a well-known philosophical dispute about the
identity of objects over time has a clear analogue for the Everettian’s worlds. Recall that
philosophers treat change of properties over time in two rival ways, depending on whether
they conceive objects that persist over time as (a) strictly self-identical across time, or as
(b) having stages (also known as temporal parts). It will be convenient to adopt a recent
jargon used in the dispute over temporal parts (cf. Lewis 1986, p. 202).  Namely, let us say
that (i) an object that persists by having temporal parts at various times ‘perdures’; and (ii)
an object without temporal parts, i.e. that is wholly present at different times, ‘endures’;
and finally, (iii) the neutral word, covering perdurance or endurance, is ‘persist'. I will use
‘transtemporal identity’ and ‘persistence’ as synonyms.
These distinctions suggest similar ones applying to worlds. Should we say that: (a)
one object, say the pointer, has contrary properties, say two non-overlapping positions,
relative to distinct worlds or branches? Or should we say that: (b) there is more than one
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object, which are very similar to one another (hence often called ‘copies’) but for having
different positions?
Most Everettians adopt the second option, (b); and besides, so do Saunders and
Wallace. I agree that there are good reasons to do so: (reasons which hold good, even if you
resist the temporal analogue, i.e. resist temporal parts). But it is important to point out the
first option, (a); (cf. Tappenden (2000), who suggests that we can think of an object relative
to a world as a new kind of part of the object, which he calls a ‘superslice’).
For we should beware of two bad reasons for adopting (b). First: for many
Everettians, (b) is simply a corollary of their view (which Saunders, Wallace and I reject)
that each component of Y in a preferred basis is inhabited by a whole population of
systems. But note that the converse fails: i.e., (b) does not require their view, so that
Saunders and Wallace can combine advocating both (b) and genuine ‘splitting’. In
particular, there is no conflict between this combination and conservation laws, like the
conservation of mass or of charge: we should not say that when a pointer ‘splits’ during a
measurement-process to give two pointers in non-overlapping positions, the mass is
doubled. For after all, we do not say in the temporal analogue that the advocate of
perdurance, who believes that a pointer of mass one kilogram has two temporal parts, is
thereby committed to the existence of a two kilogram mass.
Secondly, most discussions ignore the point made in Section 7.3, that on any exact
definitions of world, any ordinary objects are collective features of many worlds. (Indeed
for the sake of clarity, I just did so myself, when presenting the choice between (a) and (b)
as a matter of whether there are one or two pointers.) Once we notice this point, (a) is more
plausible: if an object is ‘extraordinary’, why not let it have contrary properties relative to
different worlds (or even corresponding parts as Tappenden advocates)?
So what it is the good reason for (b)? I think it is that the contrary properties
involved in two alternative outcomes of a measurement process might well be so much
more disparate than two non-overlapping positions, that it seems wrong to say some single
object is involved. I have in mind not just such pairs of properties as being alive, and being
dead from poisoning, in the case of Schrödinger’s proverbial cat; here one might well treat
the body (at least for a while) as the same object in the two outcomes, alive and dead.  But
there are more extreme cases. Imagine that one of the two outcomes of a measurement
vaporizes the pointer: what is the common object then?
You might suggest that we should identify an object with its microscopic
constituents; so that in the case of vaporizations etc. we should trace these in space and
time. But this suggestion faces objections both from philosophy and from physics. As I see
it, the main philosophical objection is that the suggestion implies wrongly that the pointer
survives being vaporized. The main physical objection arises from the point made in
Section 7.3, that quantum field theory treats particles as excitations of fields: so when we
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try to make ‘microscopic constituents’ precise, we must face the fact that the very existence
of the particles we take as constituting objects, in fact depends on the quantum state (of the
field-system)---and this state can vary between Everettian worlds in such a way that a
particle can exist in one but not the other of two worlds after a ‘split’.
8.2 Issues about Dynamics
Finally I turn to a more technical topic: what the Everettian says about dynamics, i.e. the
laws of evolution for quantum states. I will just make brief remarks, first about
determinism and then about relativistic covariance. (For these issues, the metaphysical
concerns of Section 7.3 and 8.1, such as the inhabitation of branches and the nature of
persistence through time, are by and large irrelevant.)
First, we need to distinguish two main areas of discussion: the dynamics of the
universe as a whole, and the dynamics of subsystems of the universe. The former is
simpler---at this paper’s high level of generality.  That is: of course the detailed physics of
the universe as a whole is impossibly complex, and will surely remain forever beyond our
ken. But the fact that the universe is an isolated system (strictly speaking, the only one)
means that according to orthodox quantum theory---and the Everettian---it (and it alone)
obeys the deterministic unitary evolution of the Schrödinger equation. On the other hand,
subsystems of the universe are not isolated (they are ‘open’); i.e. they are influenced by
their environment, so that their evolution is non-unitary. In general, the theoretical
description of their evolution is much more complex than that of isolated systems. So, as is
often remarked, Schrödinger and the other pioneers of quantum theory were lucky that
nature supplied some subsystems of the universe (viz. atoms) that were both sufficiently
isolated that the Schrödinger equation is an excellent approximation, and sufficiently
simple that at least some aspects of their behaviour could be understood (at least by a
pioneer of genius!)  (Similarly of course for Newton and his contemporaries: they were
lucky that nature supplied sufficiently isolated and sufficiently simple subsystems of the
universe---the ball on the inclined plane, the planets.)
Thus we return to one of Section 1’s opening themes: determinism vs.
indeterminism. For the Everettian’s idea will of course be that her postulated deterministic
evolution of the whole universe is compatible: with (i) indeterministic evolution of generic
subsystems---which is only to be expected since the subsystems are open; and also with (ii)
almost deterministic evolution of subsystems that are almost isolated, e.g. a molecule in a
gas. How to recover from an over-arching unitary evolution the right type of evolutions of
kinds (i) and (ii) is of course an ongoing research area in physics (in which decoherence
plays important roles).
 I turn to relativistic covariance. It is of course intended as a principal merit of
Everettian interpretations that they obey relativistic covariance, fundamentally rather than
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just at a phenomenological level; (unlike the pilot-wave interpretation, and maybe also the
modal interpretation and theories with a physical process of wave-packet collapse; cf.
Section 5). But again, it is important to distinguish the dynamics of the universe as a whole,
from the dynamics of its subsystems. So far as I know, Everettian discussions almost
always focus on the relativistic covariance of the former; and as I shall spell out in a
moment, I see no problems of principle lurking there. But since of course the
relativistically covariant theories we in fact confirm are theories of subsystems of the
universe (and very simple and tiny ones, to boot!), the Everettian also owes us an account of
how her postulated relativistically covariant evolution of the universe yields relativistically
covariant evolution for appropriate subsystems. So here is a lacuna, albeit one that may be
easy to fill. But let me end more positively, by outlining how the Everettian’s dynamics of
the universe as a whole can be fundamentally relativistically covariant---and thereby
returning to Saunders.
Relativistic covariance is obscured by the traditional way of presenting the
Everettian strategy which I also adopted in Sections 6 and 7; viz. using relative states,
defined in terms of the instantaneous state Y.  But there is no real problem here, for three
reasons; I give them in increasing order of technicality---the first two in effect giving us
two different notions of relativistic covariance.
First, a fundamentally relativistic quantum theory can perfectly well use foliations
of spacetime, with states Y associated with slices; provided it allows the use of arbitrary
spacelike foliations, with the Y on slices of different foliations being suitably related (in
particular by a unitary transformation). Second, there is an approach to relativistic quantum
theories which lends itself easily to foliation-independent notions and techniques: viz. the
local algebras approach, which associates an algebra of quantities with each bounded
spacetime region. And third, there is an approach to all quantum theories (including
relativistic ones), viz. the consistent histories approach, in terms of which one can
formulate the Everettian strategy, using a generalized and foliation-independent notion of
relative state.
Much more can be, and has been, said about these three reasons; in particular about
the relations between them. Here I can only note that Saunders combines these last two
approaches---local algebras and consistent histories: in short, the projectors that define the
histories are taken to be elements of local algebras. In particular, he defines a relation of
‘relative definiteness’ between histories H1 and H2, which is roughly ‘H1 has probability 1,
given that H2 is realized’; and then he discusses the relation of the consistency condition on
histories to properties like the symmetry and transitivity of relative definiteness; (1995,
Sections 2, 3; 1996a, Section 3). But I must forego details: for now, this must suffice by
way of urging that there are good prospects for formulating the Everettian strategy in
relativistic quantum theories, and in particular in the local algebras approach.
41
Acknowledgements:--Many thanks to the editors and conference participants, to Meir
Hemmo, Adrian Kent, Paul Tappenden and Lev Vaidman---and especially to Simon
Saunders and David Wallace---for discussion and comments on previous versions: if only I
could have consistently acted on all suggestions!
References
Barrett J., 1999. The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bell J., 1987. Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Berry, M., 1994. Asymptotics, singularities and the reduction of theories, Proceedings of 9th
International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, eds. D.
Prawitz, B. Skyrms and D. Westerståhl, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 597-607.
Berry, M., this volume: Chaos and the semiclassical limit of Quantum mechanics (is the
moon there when somebody looks?) Proceedings of CTNS-Vatican conference on
Quantum Physics and Quantum Field Theory.
Bohm D. & Hiley B., 1993. The Undivided Universe: an Ontological Interpretation of
QuantumTheory. London: Routledge.
Bub J., (1997), Interpreting the Quantum World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Butterfield J., 1995. Worlds, Minds and Quanta, Aristotelian Society Supplementary
    Volume 69, pp. 113-158.
Butterfield J., 1996. Whither the Minds?. British Journal for the Philosophy of
    Science 47 pp. 200-221.
Butterfield J., 1996a. Quantum Curiosities of Psychophysics, in Human Consciousness and
    Identity, ed. J. Cornwell, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 123-159.
Butterfield, J. 2001. The State of Physics; Halfway through the Woods, Journal of Soft
    Computing, April 2001, in press.
Butterfield, J., & Isham, C., 1999. The Emergence of Time in Quantum Gravity, in The
Arguments of Time, ed. J. Butterfield, London: British Academy and Oxford University
Press.
Clarke, C. this volume. Title?  Proceedings of CTNS-Vatican conference on Quantum
Physics and Quantum Field Theory.
Cushing J., 1994. Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen
       Hegemony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cushing, J. this volume, Title?  Proceedings of CTNS-Vatican conference on Quantum
Physics and Quantum Field Theory.
42
Dieks D. & Vermaas P., eds. (1998), The Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Deutsch, D. 1996. The Fabric of Reality, London; Penguin.
Dowker F., & Kent A., 1996. On the Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics,
Journal of Statistical Physics 82 pp. 1575-1646.
Everett H., 1957. ‘Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics, Reviews of Modern
Physics 29, pp. 454-462.
Fleming, G. & Butterfield, J. 2000. Strange Positions, in From Physics to Philosophy, ed. J.
Butterfield and C.Pagonis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 108-165.
Gell-Mann M., & Hartle J., 1990. Quantum Mechanics in the light of Quantum Cosmology,
in Complexity, Entropy and the Phyiscs of Information, ed. W. Zurek, Reading:
Addison-Wesley, pp. 425-459.
Geroch R., 1984. The Everett Interpretation, Nous 18, pp. 617-633.
Ghirardi G., Grassi R. & Benatti F., 1995. Describing the Macroscopic World: Closing the
Circle in the Dynamical Reduction Program, Foundations of Physics 25, pp. 5-40.
Giulini D., et al. 1996. Decoherence and the Emergence of a Classical World from Quantum
Theory, Berlin: Springer.
Hemmo M., & Pitowsky I., 2001. Probability and Nonlocality in Many Minds
Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. In preparation.
Holland P., 1993. The Quantum Theory of Motion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Joos E. & Zeh H.D., 1985. Emergence of Classical Properties through Interaction with the
Environment. Zeitschrift für Physik B59, pp. 223-235.
Kent A., 1990. Against Many Worlds Interpretations, International Journal of Modern
Physics A5, pp. 1745-1762.
Lewis D., 1973. Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis D., 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.
Lockwood M., 1996. ‘Many-Minds’ Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, British Journal
      for the Philosophy of  Science 47 pp. 159-188.
Redhead, M. this volume. The Tangled Story of the Nonlocality Issue in Quantum
Mechanics, Proceedings of CTNS-Vatican conference on Quantum Physics and
Quantum Field Theory.
Saunders S., 1995. Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Decoherence, Synthese 102, 235-266.
Saunders S., 1996. Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Tense, Synthese 107, pp. 19-53.
Saunders S., 1996a. Relativism, in Perspectives on Quantum Reality, ed. R. Clifton,
Dordrecht; Kluwer, pp. 125-142.
Saunders S., 1998. Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability, Synthese 114, pp. 373-404
Stapp H., 1993. Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics, New York; Springer-Verlag.
43
Stein H., 1984. The Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Many Worlds or None?,
Nous 18, pp. 635-652.
Tappenden P., 2000. Identity and Probability in Everett’s Multiverse, British Journal
      for the Philosophy of  Science 51 pp. 99-114.
Vaidman L., 1998. On Schizophrenic Experiences of the Neutron, Or Why we Should
Believe in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Theory, International Studies in
Philosophy of  Science 12, pp. 245-261; eprint quant-ph/9609006.
Vaidman L., 2000. The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy; only on web at http://plato.stanford.edu/.
Vermaas P., 2000, A Philosopher’s Understanding of Quantum Mechanics: Possibilities
and Impossibilities of a Modal Interpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallace D., 2001. Worlds in the Everett Interpretation, forthcoming in Studies in History
and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
Wallace D., 2001a. Thoughts on Quantum Mechanics and vice versa: Fitting the Observer
in to the Interpretation of Quantum Theory. In preparation.
Wigner E., 1962. Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem, in Good I.J. (ed.), The Scientist
Speculates, London: Heinemann.
